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Preface 
This thesis has been for the course TPK4900-Production and Quality Engineering, 
Master’s Thesis at Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) spring 
2014. The master thesis is written within the Department of Production and Quality 
Engineering. It is a further research of subsea equipment reliability based on the 
specification project, Reliability Assessment of Safety Instrumented Systems. 
When developing technical systems comprising unproven equipment, the designer is 
often required to come up with an initial reliability prediction for the new equipment 
as a basis for design decision (e.g., configuration and redundancy). In most cases, the 
reliability prediction is given in terms of a constant failure rate. Since the equipment 
is new, the experience data is usually very scarce, if not non-existing. Although 
several reliability prediction procedures have been proposed, none of the approaches 
mentioned above can be used directly to predict the failure rate of a new subsea 
systems. Therefore, the objective of this master thesis is to suggest a suitable 
approach for failure rate prediction of new subsea process equipment that can be 
considered as “marinized” from topside equipment. 
Intended audiences are those with basic knowledge of reliability theory. 
 
 
 
Trondheim, 24th of June 2014 
 
Shanshan Huo 
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Executive Summary 
Reliability prediction plays a critical role in the reliability engineering process. It describes 
the process used to estimate the constant failure rate during the useful life of the system. For 
electronic components, the reliability prediction is often based on the procedure in MIL-
HDBK-217F; besides, several methods and models for reliability prediction have been well 
established. However, for mechanical and electro-mechanical equipment, there is no 
generally accepted method for reliability prediction. 
Therefore, a literature review of available standards, guidelines, and handbooks, which 
provide procedures and field data for reliability prediction, is presented first. Based on these 
literatures, the methodologies widely used are classified into three main categories (i.e., 
bottom-up statistical methods, top-down similarity analysis methods, and bottom-up physics-
of-failure methods). 
Further, some commonly used approaches (e.g., the BORA approach, failure rate prediction 
with influencing factors) mostly based on the proportional hazards (PH) model developed for 
specific industry areas are presented. Afterwards demonstrate the principle of these 
approaches by giving simple examples. The discussion of the pros and cons for each 
approach is followed. In spite of some limitations and inaccurate of predictions, the general 
principles of these approaches have been used to develop new failure rate prediction methods. 
On the basis of these approaches, a detailed procedure that is suitable for reliability prediction 
of new subsea process equipment, which aiming to overcome some of the shortcomings of 
the existing approaches, is suggested. The new approach makes it possible to perform a 
relatively complete consideration of RIFs, includes modelling of interactions between RIFs 
and mentioned the common cause effects among all failure modes listed. 
Finally, test the applicability of proposed procedure using a simple case study on a multistage 
pump and compare the procedure with the approaches introduced. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In the real world, all products and systems are unreliable because they degrade with age 
and/or usage and ultimately fail, which have serious consequences for both the producer and 
user of such products. The reliability of a product depends on a complex interaction of the 
laws of physics, engineering design, manufacturing processes, management decisions, 
random events, and usage. Therefore, improving the reliability of a product is also often a 
complex process, involving many activities, including redesign, upgrading of materials and 
process improvements, as well as additional elements such as handling, storage, and shipping. 
All in all, it is very important for both producer and user to get to know the reliability issues 
(e.g. assessment, prediction, improvement, and so forth) at each stage in a product life cycle.  
When developing technical systems comprising unproven equipment, the designer is often 
required to come up with an initial reliability prediction for the new equipment as a basis for 
design decision (e.g., configuration and redundancy). Reliability prediction often takes place 
or should take place in the early phase in a life cycle thereafter, resulting in updated 
predictions. This would be the case, for example, in analysis of systems where: (i) The 
product is complex, often involving new technology; (ii) Reliability is critical, with lack of 
reliability being very costly and possibly resulting in loss of life; (iii) Overdesign is highly 
undesirable, as it results in increased weight and hence highly inflated operating costs 
(Blischke and Murthy, 2011).  
In most cases, the reliability prediction is given in terms of a constant failure rate. Since the 
equipment is new, the experience data is usually very scarce, if not non-existing. A reliability 
prediction procedure is therefore required. For electronic components, the reliability 
prediction is often based on the procedure in (MIL-HDBK-217F, 1991). This procedure has 
been further developed and refined in other data sources, such as FIDES. For mechanical 
equipment, some similar notions are presented in MechRel (NSWC-11, 2011).  
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1.2 Motivation 
Reliability prediction is important for both hardware and software. When a complex system 
involves both, prediction of total system reliability becomes more important and difficult. 
This is certainly the case in analysis of any subsea equipment. Reliability prediction of new 
equipment is a hot topic in the subsea industry, where a lot of unproven process equipment 
currently has to be installed. Most of the equipment is based on similar topside systems and 
the industry refers to the new application as “marinization” of the topside technology.  
In the subsea oil and gas industry, new systems and new technologies are often met with 
skepticism, since the operators’ fear that they may fail and lead to production loss, costly 
repair interventions, and hydrocarbon leakages to the sea. Before a new system is accepted, 
the producer has to convince the operator that it is fit for use and has a high reliability. This is 
often done through a technology qualification program. An important part of the technology 
qualification program is to predict the system failure rate at an early stage in the system 
development process owing to the high cost of design modifications later in the development 
process  (Rahimi and Rausand, 2013). 
Except for those procedures in several data sources, it is also possible to use physical 
approaches, study the factors that influence the reliability and compare these with similar 
factors in a known application of similar equipment/technology (if relevant). So the situation 
of no clear nor agreed procedure existing, large potential economic benefits, few realistic 
feedback data for newly designed subsea process equipment has driven both the oil and gas 
companies’ and mine attention to establishing a feasible and effective approach to predicting 
the plant-specific failure rates for which ample data are available in (OREDA, 2009). 
1.3 Objective 
The main objective of this master thesis is to perform and document a survey of existing 
reliability prediction approaches and then discuss the pros and cons of each approach. 
Furthermore, suggest a suitable approach for failure rate prediction of new subsea process 
equipment that can be considered as “marinization” from similar topside equipment. 
These challenges are addressed explicitly and the main objectives are achieved through 
meeting the sub-goals of the thesis:  
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- Present existing definitions of reliability prediction and discuss the importance and 
difficulties of executing the prediction. 
- Review some commonly used standards and guidelines for reliability prediction and 
discuss their scopes of application as well as limitation. 
- Perform a literature review to study different methods and models that have been 
published related to reliability prediction and give a general classification for these 
methodologies. Furthermore, discuss the pros and cons of these methods and models. 
- Develop a detailed procedure for reliability prediction of new subsea equipment that 
can be considered as the “marinization” of topside equipment based on the 
information of similar topside equipment and explain the improvements of this 
approach comparing to existing approaches afterwards discuss the limitation and 
difficulties during implementing. 
- Demonstrate the new approach through a case study involving the information from 
OREDA for topside equipment to predict the reliability of the subsea equipment. 
1.4 Assumptions and Limitation 
Failure rate predictions are based on the following assumptions: 
- The prediction model uses a simple system with all components in series. 
- Component failure rates are assumed to be constant for the time period considered. 
- All failure modes listed in the following approaches are considered to be independent. 
- No distinction is made between complete failures and drift failures. 
- Process weaknesses have been eliminated. 
- The control of probability of failure on demand  (PFD) can be achieved through the 
control of changes in RIFs 
Due to the limited time and knowledge, many relevant issues are not included in this master 
thesis. Some of them do not influence the estimate of system failure rate a lot, others are very 
difficult to analysis owing to the lack of new system design or else. The issues that are not 
considered in the thesis are: 
- Results are dependent on the trustworthiness of data input. 
- Only a few critical failure modes and failure causes are considered in the case studies. 
Therefore, it is not possible to obtain an accurate estimate for the plant-specific 
equipment. 
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- The interactions between RIFs are mentioned and a practical analysis model is 
presented. However, due to the high workload, we do not include the interaction 
effects into failure rate calculation. 
- A comprehensive and thorough reliability influence factors (RIF) consideration is 
very important for getting a realistic estimate. Therefore, the RIF model should 
contain factors of technical, operational, human, as well as organizational aspects. 
Due to the difficulty of measuring human and organizational factors, we choose only 
two RIFs relating to human error for simplification. 
- We assume the design and materials difference between topside and subsea 
equipment could be ignored since there is no available information and data. 
- In some approaches, they followed standards and guidelines that are established for 
electronic devices rather than mechanical equipment. 
- Common cause effect is mentioned but not analyzed quantitatively. 
- In general, redundancies cannot be modelled. 
1.5 Structure of the Report 
This master thesis is structured as follows: 
- Chapter 1: A literature review was undertaken to identify the problem, objectives, 
limitations and structure of the thesis. 
- Chapter 2: Present the necessary background information and concepts to readers. 
Introduce and discuss existing methods and models used for reliability prediction 
presented in several standards e.g.,(MIL-HDBK-217F, 1991), give a general 
classification for these methodologies. Furthermore, discuss the pros and cons of 
these methods and models. 
- Chapter 3: Elaborate some approaches developed for specific industries or issues. 
Demonstrate the principle of these approaches by giving simple examples. 
- Chapter 4: Suggest a detailed procedure that is suitable for reliability prediction of 
new subsea equipment. Test the applicability of proposed procedure using a simple 
case and compare the result with the approaches introduced in chapter 3. 
- Chapter 5: Present the summary and conclusions for this thesis, and then propose 
recommendations for further work. 
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Chapter 2 Reliability prediction 
This thesis aims at dealing with various aspects related to failures of equipment or systems 
that are “marinization” from topside technology. The study of these topics requires that we 
begin with a good and clear conceptual understanding and have a framework that allows us to 
integrate the various issues involved in an effective manner. In this chapter, we discuss the 
basic concepts needed and define the scope of methodologies, guidelines, methods and 
models that we are going through. 
2.1 Concepts of Reliability Prediction 
In this thesis, we deal with some of the key engineering, analytical, and statistical tools used 
in reliability prediction indicating their roles in the reliability prediction process. Reliability 
predictions are made in many contexts. To set the scene, in this section, various definitions of 
reliability prediction with respect to a product life cycle are introduced.  
Reliability prediction describes the process used to estimate the constant failure rate during 
the useful life of a product. This however is not possible because predictions assume that 
(EPMSA, 2005): 
- The design is perfect, the stresses known; everything is within ratings at all times, so 
that only random failures occur. 
- Every failure of every part will cause the equipment to fail. 
- The database is valid. 
These assumptions are sometimes wrong. The design can be less than perfect, not every 
failure of every part will cause the equipment to fail, and the database is likely to be at least 
15 years out-of-date. However, none of this matters much, if the predictions are used to 
compare different approaches rather than to establish an absolute figure for reliability. This is 
what predictions were originally designed for. 
Some prediction manuals allow the substitution of use of vendor reliability data where such 
data is known instead of the recommended database data. Such data is very dependent on the 
environment under which it was measured and so, predictions based on such data could no 
longer be depended on for comparison purposes. 
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As noted previously, there are many instances where prediction and/or assessment of product 
reliability are desired or even may be essential. These may occur in the various stages of 
product design, development, and testing, production, and operations, and continue nearly 
until product worn out. Reliability prediction could be used for many objectives (Sinnadurai 
et al., 1998) (Pechta et al., 2002) including: 
- Determining if the generic requirements for materials, parts, components, and so forth 
are achievable; 
- Performing trade-off studies; 
- Setting plans for developmental testing; 
- Planning for design improvements; 
- Providing a basis for evaluation of reliability growth; 
- Helping to achieve a reliable manufacturing process; 
- Setting of factory standards for accept/reject decisions; 
- Cost analysis, including life cycle cost studies; 
- Identifying and ranking potential reliability problems; 
- Aiding in business decisions (e.g., warranty planning, spare provisioning, budget 
allocation, and scheduling) and regulatory and certificatory concerns); 
- Establishing baseline for logistic support requirements (e.g. maintenance, spares, and 
upgrades) 
Therefore, to be meaningful, reliability prediction must be done in the context of specified 
goals. Thus target values for reliability must be set up, used as benchmarks, and modified as 
necessary as further information is developed, cost factors are analyzed, and realistic, 
achievable goals evolve. In the following section (section 2.2), several methodologies and 
models used in the industry are presented and furthermore, how they fulfill the 
aforementioned objectives are discussed. 
Reliability prediction has many roles in the reliability engineering process. The predictions 
can be used for assessment of whether reliability goals e.g. MTTF (mean time to failure) can 
be reached, evaluation of alternative designs and life cycle costs, the provision of data for 
system reliability and availability analysis, logistic support strategy planning and to establish 
objectives for reliability tests. 
The impact of proposed design changes on reliability is determined by comparing the 
reliability predictions of existing and proposed designs. A reliability prediction can also assist 
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in evaluating the significance of reported failures. For the most cases, reliability predictions 
are made in the early stages of the design and development of an item (i.e., prior to its actual 
operation). And then the products are ordinarily modified and refined in later stages of its life 
cycle, and, as testing is done and other information is obtained, prediction progresses to 
assessment of actual reliability. Therefore, it is necessary to undertake a careful analysis of 
potential failures and their underlying causes. Failure modes and effects analysis (FMECA) 
and fault tree (FT) analysis are two of the principal tools used for this purpose. 
Typical tasks in reliability predictions are: 
- Prediction of the reliability of a system for a given design and selected set of 
components; 
- Prediction of the reliability of a system in a different environment form those for 
which data are available; 
- Prediction of the reliability of the system at the end of the development program. 
In summary, reliability prediction deals with evaluation of a design prior to actual 
construction of the system. It is an attempt to evaluate the consequences of decisions made 
before the system is built and/or put into industry. It deals with analysis using models rather 
than actual systems and provides a basis for testing planning, manufacturing, and evaluation 
of reliability growth, maintenance, and other management activities. 
2.2 General reliability prediction methodologies 
The method used for reliability prediction is often a matter of contention. It is understood that 
the benefits of a reliability prediction are dependent on the accuracy and completeness of the 
information used to perform the prediction and on the other methods used to conduct the 
prediction (Pechta et al., 2002). The correct way to know the reliability of a product is the 
collection of field returns, the analysis of the data and then failure analysis of the failed parts. 
A wide range of reliability prediction methodologies is available today for electronic systems. 
According to (Foucher et al., 2002) the commonly used reliability prediction methodologies 
can be classified into some categories easy for understanding. The most common reliability 
prediction methods and their latest update are listed in Table 1.  
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These methods listed above have been grouped into three types: 
- Bottom-up statistical methods (BS); 
- Top-down similarity analysis methods based on external failure database (TD); 
- Bottom-up physics-of-failure methods (BP). 
The first two types use statistical analysis of failure data while the last one refers to the use of 
physics-of-failure (PoF) models. There had been several articles on the merits and demerits of 
the statistical methods of reliability prediction. Detailed introduction to these three types of 
methods will be discussed in the following sub-sections. The different instances for 
applications are also clarified. 
Table 1 Non-exhaustive list of assessed reliability prediction methods and their updates 
BS SAEa reliability prediction method 1987 
 Mil-Hdbk-217 1995 
 Telcordia SR-332 1997 
 CNETb RDF-93 1993 
 Corrected 1999  
 CNET RDF-2000 2000 
 British Telecom 1995 
 HRD-5  
 Siemens SN29500 1999 
 NTTc procedure 1985 
 Reliability Analysis Center 2000 
 PRISM  
   
TD Honeywell In-Service Reliability Assessment Program 
(HIRAP) similarity analysis method 
1999 
  REMM Reliability Enhancement Methodology and Modelling 2001 
 DERAd Transport Reliability Assessment and Calculation 
System (TRACS) 
1999 
   
BP Airbus-Giat use of manufacturer testing results 1999 
 CADMP, calcePWA, calceFAST (CALCE EPSCe, University 
of Maryland) software 
2001 
a Society of Automotive Engineers (USA) 
b Centre National d’Etude des Télécommunications (France) 
c Nippon Telephone & Telegraph (Japan) 
d Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (UK Ministry of Defence)  
e Computer Aided Life Cycle Engineering (CALCE) Electronic Products and System Center (USA) 
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2.2.1 Bottom-up statistical methods 
BS methods use prediction models developed from statistical curve fitting of component 
failure data, which may have been collected in the field, in laboratory or from manufacturers. 
These models are dependent of the component manufacture and incorrectly assume that the 
failure rate of each electronic component is constant over time, the system or equipment 
failure causes are inherently linked to components whose failure are independent of each 
other, and the failure rate for a complete product could be determined by adding together the 
failure rates of all components. As the causes of failure in the field are rarely determined, 
tradeoffs between competing technologies a baseline for reliability assessment, or the 
extension of these models to new products or to new applications are inadequate (Pecht and 
Dasgupta, 1995). 
The methods used in BS methods are mainly based on two types: 
- Failure rate prediction at reference conditions (parts count method) 
- Failure rate prediction at operating conditions (part stress method) 
As shown in Table 2, “parts count analysis” models assume that the component operators 
under typical operating conditions, whereas “part stress analysis” models require an input of 
parameters that are included in the models of the component failure rate,𝜆. Although the parts 
count methodology is available for use, the focus is on the part stress methodology for most 
accurate results. The explanations to these equations can be founded in (Foucher et al., 2002). 
Table 2 Examples of models used in BS methods for microcircuits 
Parts count 
G Q L      (1) 
 (Mil-Hdbk-217)  
 
a Q     (2) 
 (CNET)  
   
Parts stress 
1 2(C )T E Q LC         (3) 
 (Mil-Hdbk-217F)  
 
1 2(C )t T V B E s Q LC             (4) 
 (CNET)  
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The models may be detailed as in the last project of CNET, known as RDF2000 (IEC62380, 
2004), see (Telecommunications, 1993), where models have been defined for boards and 
hybrid circuits as well (UTEC80810, 2000). 
2.2.2 Top-down similarity analysis methods 
Top-down similarity analysis methods based on proprietary databases (TD) use similarity 
analysis between previous system or sub-systems with a known level of reliability and newly 
designed systems. This is the very useful for predicting the failure rate of new subsea 
equipment and will be used in the case study in chapter 4. All failure causes, not only 
component failure rates are considered and therefore, failure cause analysis is of the utmost 
importance. 
A typical TD approach is summarized by the following steps: 
- Collection of failure data from the field; 
- Assessment of field data (particularly equipment/board failure causes, calculation of 
the associated reliability); 
- Determination of failure rates at the circuit card assembly (CCA) level, based on the 
number of unique CCAs per equipment; 
- Determination of the failure rates at the piece part and interconnect levels based on 
the number of piece parts and interconnects per CCA; 
- Determination of the failure rates for equipment/board failure causes not related to 
piece parts and interconnects; 
- Creation of the in-service failure rate database with all previous pieces of information 
according to the following physical model categories: passive (low/high complexity), 
interconnections, semiconductor (low/high complexity), manufacturing process, 
design process, other failure causes; 
- Comparison of existing to proposed designs or similarity process with the following 
steps: 
i. Review products for which field data is available; 
ii. Identify characteristic differences (e.g., design, manufacturing, and so on) 
iii. Quantify the impact of the characteristic differences on each physical model 
category; 
iv. Incorporate field data (percent of each physical model category, overall end 
item or assembly failure rates); 
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v. Compute the new item (board, CCA or equipment) failure rate according to: 
 
 
1
( )
n
p a a
a
D F d 

   (1) 
Where p is the field failure rate for the predecessor item, aD is the distribution percentage 
for physical model category a, 
aF is the difference factor between the new and previous items 
for category a, and n is the total number of physical model categories. 
2.2.3 Bottom-up physical-of-failure methods 
Due to the unrealistic assumptions used in BS and TD methods, reliability predictions are 
usually far from accurate. Manufactures begin to use physics-of-failure methodology, which 
incorporates reliability into the design process, in an effort to prevent parts from failing in 
service. A new criterion for judging failure models, their applicability, utility and design 
implications were established and constant definitions of failure, failure mechanism, failure 
modes and production confidence were developed and used. 
Therefore, BP methods requires comprehensive knowledge of the thermal, mechanical, 
electrical and chemical life cycle environment as well as processed leading to failures in the 
field in order to apply appropriate failure models. This type of prediction method has been 
used quite successfully in the design of mechanical, civil, and aerospace structures. It is 
almost mandatory for buildings and bridges, because the sample size is usually on, affording 
little opportunity for testing the completed product, or for reliability growth. However, 
electronics packaging and interconnection community is lagging behind in adopting physics-
of-failure methods. 
The first BP method listed in Table 1 uses the manufacturer’s reliability data test results 
(highly accelerated stress test, temperature humidity bias, and temperature cycling …) at the 
component level. These data are computed with the help of statistical laws with confidence 
levels generally set at 60%. The ways to get accelerate factors (AF) can be found in the 
detailed acceleration models proposed by (Charpenel and P, 1997). The component failure 
rate is the sum of all the failure rates (thermal, humidity, voltage, thermal cycling). The board 
failure rate is the sum of all the failure rates of the components. 
The highest level of BP methods (CALCE software) predicts the time to failure of board or 
component by targeting the most common failure mechanisms at various sites of the 
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component assembly. Required information includes material characteristics, geometry, 
environmental, and operation loads. Detailed description can be found in (McCluskey, 2001). 
The reliability of a system is the reliability of the weakest point in the system with the 
associated failure site, mode, and mechanism identified. 
2.2.4 Discussion of applicability of these methods 
The discussion focuses on the following areas: the sources of the data, the inputs, the 
sensitivity of the models and the outputs. 
Generally, the more generic the sources of data and environment they come from the better. 
However, each method considers the environment differently: BS methods use environmental 
and load fitted factors (for operating mode with or without storage) based on failure modes 
(not causes) whereas BP methods use load profiles. This is because that the environment for 
the BS methods derives from the failure databases that may be hampered by the following 
issues: 
- A large amount of experimental data is required to set up representative fittings; 
- These fittings become pessimistic over time because of data aging and component 
reliability improvement; 
- New technologies are conservatively dealt with, although PRISM (Denson, 1999) and 
CNET(Telecommunications, 1993) latest issues then to address this problem; 
- Extrinsic and intrinsic failures are mixed and are used to get aggregate failure without 
mathematical or physical justification. 
Similarly, TD methods need a regular updating of their failure in-service databases, which 
depends on the companies policies and investments. Eventually, all removals need to be 
analyzed, failures tracked down and failure rates stored for each cause of failures at each 
level. The inputs to the methods are summarized in Table 3. 
In most cases with BS methods, the result reflects the reliability of the components, which are 
no longer the main contributors to the system reliability due to quality improvement and 
system increased complexity (system level failures are overlooked). Results with TD methods 
could be refined by a large use of tests and field data. BP methods like CALCE software need 
a detailed knowledge of information, which might be considered as proprietary by 
manufacturers. These methods also require significant time resources. A prior knowledge of 
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failure mechanisms of failed products is also need to choose models geared to actual failure 
mechanisms.  
Table 3 Inputs to the different reliability prediction methods 
Method Inputs 
BS Part types, count and quality level 
 Application environment 
 System configuration 
  
TD Failure rates of several similar items 
 Characteristic differences 
  
BP Material properties 
 Design characteristics 
 Assembly techniques 
 Usage environment 
 Functional loads 
 
The elements that measure the sensitivity of the models differ among these methods. In BS 
methods, the sensitivity to operational and environmental parameters varies and the 
predictions are optimistic or pessimistic depending on the application. However, the models 
account for a great deal of components and their implementation is easy to use. This is 
halfway from TD methods, which models account for internal design and manufacturing 
failures at a high level. When considering BP methods, a difference shall be made between 
Airbus-Giat and CALCE methods. 
The outputs of the methods are quite different. BS methods provide the users with an average 
failure rate of the average production. Failures are considered to occur randomly and failure 
rate is therefore considered as constant. TD methods output a failure rate, which is monitored 
over time. This failure rate is an average of a given production. Failure causes are identified 
but no confidence level is provided. The outputs from BP methods differ. Some deliver an 
average failure rate of a given production, while some deliver a time to failure for the 
component. 
Based on the discussions above, Table 4 rates subjectively the characteristics of these methods 
in view of a set of criteria deemed appropriate. As can been seen no single method addresses 
all criteria comprehensively: tradeoffs need to be made between the models usability and the 
required amount of detailed information. 
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Table 4 Comparison criteria for use 
Comparison criteria BS TD BP 
    
Accuracy Relative Absolute Absolute 
Ease of data exchange Easy Difficult Easy 
Amount of devoted resources Small Important Extensivea 
Time to obtain reliability estimate Short Short Long 
Ease of customization No Yes Yes 
Traceability Difficult Easy Easy 
Repeatability High Medium Low 
Ability for evaluation Difficult Yes Yes 
a If no material, part, or board library is available 
Not all these criteria bear the same significance. Accuracy, amount of devoted resources, ease 
of customization and ability for evaluation seem to be more important to be achieved. 
Detailed description can be found in.  
There is another way to weigh up the different methods. Table 5 rates BS, TD, and BP 
methods compared to the satisfaction of the objectives stated in the introduction. This is a 
subjective evaluation of the methods and their ability to contribute to the overall reliability 
availability maintainability safety assessment process. However, it shows that BP methods 
are fit for design trade-off, board qualification, and manufacturing improvements. 
BP methods are fit for design trade-off, quantification, and manufacturing improvements. BS 
empirical data-based methods are appropriate for delivering an average reliability figure for 
an average production, which may be appropriate for the following stages: selection and 
management of components figure of merit comparison, warranty, maintenance planning, and 
contract negotiation. 
At the current level of availability of tools, TD methods offer a very good trade-off and 
satisfy most of the objectives, but one should remember that they cannot be standardized as 
most data are proprietary. PRISM (Denson, 1999) could lead the way to TD method 
standardization. Nevertheless, some methodologies of PRISM, which can be considered as a 
mix between BS and TD, may avoid the need for large internal failure data collection.  
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Table 5 Comparison criteria as management of objectives 
Objectives BS TD BP 
Determine if a reliability requirement is achievable Lowb Yes Yes 
    
Help to achieve a reliable design No No Yes 
- By tracking down overstressed parts No No Yes 
- By performing a failure root-cause analysis No Yes Yes 
- By comparing design trade-off studies Yes Yes Yes 
    
Help to achieve a reliable manufacturing process No No Yes 
- Assess potential warranty risks Lowb Yes No 
- Provide inputs to safety analysis Lowb Yes No 
- Establish baseline for logistic support requirements Lowb Yes No 
b Use of external databases makes the reliability figure relative and therefore brings little confidence 
to subsequent steps of the process. 
Both empirical and PoF-based reliability prediction methods present advantages as well as 
shortcomings. On the one hand, PoF methods can successfully be used for qualification and 
quality assurance in order to improve design and manufacturing robustness. On the other 
hand, statistical methods, based on and enriched by thorough failure cause analysis, external 
or internal database and similarity analysis, are fit for rapid assessment and may supply 
helpful figures for further steps including safety analysis, warranty risk management, and 
field support.  
2.3 Standards for reliability prediction 
Reliability specification and demonstration is an activity between customers and suppliers. In 
the absence of proper procedure, this activity may not meet the requirements and product 
needs. The methods used for reliability prediction is often a matter of contention. It is 
understood that the benefits of a reliability prediction are dependent on the accuracy and 
completeness of the information used to perform the prediction and on the methods used to 
conduct the prediction (Pechta et al., 2002).  
Therefore, several standards, for example (IEEE1332, 1998) and (IEEE1413, 1998) have 
been established to streamline the process of developing a reliability program that is value 
added and suits the needs of both customers and supplier, and to understand the risks 
associated. 
16 
 
For complex electronic systems, reliability prediction is often carried out in parallel with the 
product design, prototyping, and volume shipment. During the early design phase, reliability 
prediction provides preliminary knowledge about the lifetime of the new product. MIL-
HDBK-217 and SR-332 have been widely used as the guidelines in the industries to forecast 
the new product reliability (Jin et al., 2010). 
These approaches need relevant resources and a large amount of field hours. The economic 
constraints allow this approach to be used only by large companies. Small companies usually 
want to obtain a reliability figure, which can be obtained with limited effort; therefore, the 
use of “reliability handbook” is necessary (Cassanelli et al., 2005). 
IEEE 1332 
It was developed for the development and production of electronics systems and equipment. 
The aim was to ensure that every activity during the development of the product adds value 
and that the customer’s requirements and products needs are met, which is achieving by 
satisfy the following three objectives.  
- The supplier shall work with the customer, to determine and understand the 
customer’s rudiments and product needs; 
- The supplier shall structure and follow a series of engineering activities to meet those 
requirements and needs; 
- The supplier shall include activities that assure the product need have been satisfied. 
The standard guides suppliers in planning a reliability program that suits their design 
philosophy, the product concept, and the resources at their disposal. It has found wide 
acceptance in many industries.  
IEEE 1413 
The IEEE reliability prediction standard 1413 was developed to identify the key required 
elements for an understandable and credible reliability prediction, and to provide its users 
with sufficient information to select a prediction methodology and to effectively use the 
results. A prediction complying with this standard includes sufficient information regarding 
the inputs, assumptions, and uncertainties associated with the methodology used to make the 
prediction, enabling the risk associated with the methodology to be understood. 
According to IEEE1413, the item for which prediction is performed must be clearly identified. 
This identification should be performed using the following: 
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- A description of the product, electronic system, or equipment; 
- Product function, architecture, geometries, and materials; 
- Possible redundancy; 
- Hardware and software relationship and human factors; 
- System level block diagram. 
Since the reasons for performing a reliability prediction vary, a clear statement of the 
intended use of prediction results obtained from an IEEE 1413-comliant method is required 
to be included with final report. Besides, it should also identify the approach, rationale, and 
references to where the method is documented. Thus, an IEEE 1413-compliant reliability 
prediction report must include: 
- Reasons why the reliability predictions were performed; 
- The intended use of the reliability prediction results; 
- Information on how the reliability prediction results much not be used; 
- Where precautions are necessary; 
- Definition of failures and failure criteria (i.e., failure modes and failure mechanisms) 
- Description of the process to develop the prediction (i.e., assumptions made in the 
assessment, methods and models, and source of data) 
- Required prediction format (i.e., prediction metrics and confidence level) 
As specified in IEEE1413, the inputs includes, but not limited to, usage, environment, 
lifetime, temperature, shock and vibration, airborne contaminants, humidity, voltage, 
radiation, power, packaging, handling, transportation, storage, manufacturing, duty cycles, 
maintenance, prediction metrics, confidence levels, design criteria, and system design 
parameters. Besides prediction outputs, the prediction results section should also contain 
conclusions and recommendations. 
The IEEE1413 is not a reliability prediction method and it does not replace or supplement 
any available prediction method. A prediction made according to IEEE 1413 ensures that the 
benefits and limitations of a prediction method is considered and evaluated by the engineers 
preparing the prediction and that the users of the prediction are aware of the same.  
A guidebook for IEEE 1413 
The purpose of this glide is to assist in the selection and use of reliability prediction 
methodology satisfying IEEE 1413, and thus making informed decisions regarding the 
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compliance of carious methodologies to IEEE standard 1413. The guide is limited to the 
hardware reliability prediction methodologies and specifically excludes software reliability, 
availability, maintainability and human reliability. It does not discuss the company specific 
proprietary prediction methodologies either. 
All the methods described in the guidebook are then evaluated as per the requirements 
established in IEEE 1413 as described in last section. The criteria used for the evaluation of 
these methods consist of a list of questions based on IEEE 1413 concerning the inputs, 
assumptions, and uncertainties associated with each methodology, enabling the risk 
associated with the methodologies to be identified. The assessment criteria are shown in Table 
6 and their results are shown in Appendix B. 
The guide reviews the engineering information assessment that is critical for developing an 
IEEE 1413-compliant reliability prediction and describes the reliability prediction methods 
such as handbooks based on historic data (MIL-HDBK-217, RAC’s PRISM, SAE’s 
reliability prediction method, Telcordia SR-332 (SR-332, 2001), the CNET reliability 
prediction model), predictions using field data and test data, and the stress and damage model 
approach. Examples of use are provided for each method. 
Table 6 Assessment Criteria of Reliability Prediction Methodologies 
 IEEE 1413 Assessment Criteria 
1 Does the methodology identify the sources used to develop the prediction 
methodology and describe the extent to which the source is known? 
2 Are assumptions used to conduct the prediction according to the 
methodology identified, including those used for the unknown data? 
3 Are sources of uncertainty in the prediction results identified? 
4 Are limitations of the prediction results identified? 
5 Are failure modes identified? 
6 Are failure mechanisms identified? 
7 Are confidence levels for prediction results identified? 
8 Does the methodology account for life cycle environmental conditions, 
including those encountered during a) product usage (including power 
and voltage conditions), b)packaging, c)handling, d) storage, e) 
transportation, and f) maintenance conditions? 
9 Does the Methodology account for material, geometry, and architectures 
that comprise the parts? 
10 Does the methodology account for part quality? 
11 Does methodology allow incorporation of reliability data and experience? 
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IEC61709 
The standard (IEC61709, 2004) “Electronic components – Reliability, Reference conditions 
for failure rates and stress models for conversion” allows developing a database of failure 
rates and extrapolating the same for other operating conditions using stress models provided. 
The standard IEC 61709: 
- Gives guidance on obtaining accurate failure rate data for components used on 
electronic equipment, so that we can precisely predict reliability of systems. 
- Specifies reference conditions for obtaining failure rate data, so that data from 
different sources can be compared on a consistent basis. 
- Describes stress models as a basis for conversion of the failure rate data from 
reference conditions to the actual operating conditions. 
Benefits of using IEC 61709: 
- The adopted reference conditions are typical for the majority of applications of 
components in equipment; this allows realistic reliability predictions in the early 
design phase (parts count) 
- The stress models are generic for the different component types; they represent a good 
fit of observed data for the component types; this simplifies the prediction approach. 
- Will lead to harmonization of different data sources; this supports communication 
between parties. 
If failure rate data are given in accordance with this standard then no additional information 
on specified conditions is required. The stated stress models contain constants that were 
defined according to the state of the art. These are averages of typical component values 
taken from tests or specified by various manufacturers. 
A factor for the effect of environmental application conditions is basically not used in IEC 
61709 because the influence of the environmental application conditions on the component 
depends essentially on the design of equipment. Thus, such an effect may be considered 
within the reliability prediction of equipment using an overall environmental application 
factor. 
Figure 1 provides as an example for the use of IEC61709 for developing a failure rate database 
and for carrying out failure rate predictions. 
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FIDES Guide 2004 
The reliability methodology FIDES Guide 2004 is created by FIDES Group-a consortium of 
leading French companies. It is declared to be based on the physics of failures supported by 
the analysis of test data, field returns and existing modelling. 
FIDES (FIDES, 2004) is a new reliability assessment methodology for electronic systems 
using COTS (commercial off the shelf), as well as electronic parts developed by boards or 
sub-assemblies. It is an alternative for the unsuitability of MIL-HDBK 217, lack for harsh 
environments of RDF 2000 and weakness in models and mission profile definition of PRISM 
methodology. Moreover, FIDES focused all elemental operations of the life cycle that 
influence the reliability through a list of reliability related recommendations allowing 
building the reliability of electronic systems using COTS.  
The methodology for reliability assessment in electronics has two parts: 
- Component reliability prediction guide, 
- Reliability process control and audit guide. 
It takes into account the three major contributors of the COTS reliability, which are its 
technology, process and use. FIDES key points are listed below: 
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- Accurate modelization for COTS components, electronic boards and subassemblies 
like hard disks or screens, allowing distinguish many suppliers; 
- Identification and qualification of process contributors through the whole life cycle; 
- Identification and taking into account all technological and physical factors acting on 
reliability for harsh environments; 
- Modelization of overstresses (electrical, mechanical and thermal); 
- Accurate description of any mission profiles. 
The generic model consists in the product of two terms, the first one being a sum of terms of 
physical stress factors and the second one being the product of cycle life process 
contributions. On another way, the model can be written as: 
  𝜆 = 𝜆𝑃ℎ𝑦 ∙ 𝜋𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∙ 𝜋𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 (2) 
where, λ is the predicted failure rate of the COTS, 𝜆𝑃ℎ𝑦  is the physical contribution, 
𝜋𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔  is a factor representing the quality and the manufacturing technical 
control of the COTS, and 𝜋𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠  is a factor representing the quality and the technical 
control of the design process, the manufacturing and the use of the product holding the 
COTS. The influence of the process on the reliability is quantified from an audit of the 
process. A detailed  example of implementation can be found in (Charpenel et al., 2003). 
RIAC 217Plus 
The model in this handbook has been developed by the reliability information analysis center 
(RIAC) chartered by UD DoD (department of defense) as an official successor of the MIL-
HDBK-217F and PRISM methodology. It is based on principles of physics-of-failure 
endorsed by statistical analysis of empirical reliability data from many different industries 
and a widespread field of applications and environmental and operational profiles (RIAC-
HDBK-217Plus, 2006). 
The goal for developing the RIAC 217Plus was to provide prediction models that allow 
estimation of failure rate of various component types according to the primary failure 
mechanism adequately sensitive to operating scenarios and stresses with an acceptable 
accuracy. 
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- Component reliability prediction model 
The component models are the mathematical sum of over the failure rate for each generic 
class of failure mechanisms. These include operating failures, failures caused by thermal 
cycling, failures associated with solder joints and induced failures. 
Depending on component type, the following application dependent parameters are 
considered: component characteristics (e.g., capacity of capacitors), electrical stress ratio, and 
component internal temperature rise. 
- System level model 
The system level model is an optional term of the reliability prediction to account for the 
process applied during the product life cycle. The model is express by: 
𝜆 = 𝜆𝑒𝑢𝑞𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡(∏𝑝 + ∏𝑑 +∏𝑚 +∏𝑠 +∏ 𝑖 + ∏𝑛 +∏𝑤) + 𝜆𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 (3) 
where, 𝜆𝑒𝑢𝑞𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡is the total failure rate of the equipment, ∏𝑝 is part process factor, ∏𝑑 is 
design process factor, ∏𝑚  is manufacturing process factor, ∏𝑠  is system management 
process factor, ∏𝑖 is induced process factor, ∏𝑛 is no-defect process factor, ∏𝑤 is wear out 
process factor, 𝜆𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 is software failure rate prediction. 
Each factor will decrease if “better than average” processes are applied and vice versa. 
A comparison between FIEDS and RIAC 217Plus with field data is presented in (Held and 
Fritz, 2009)  
The different methods have various applications, merits and limitations and some of these are 
listed in the following, see Table 7. 
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Table 7 Comparison of features of reliability prediction methods 
Reliability prediction model Application Limitations 
MIL-HDBK-217F It provides failure rate and stress 
models for parts count and part 
stress predictions. It provides 
models for many component and 
assembly type and fourteen 
environments ranging from ground 
benign to canon launch. It is well 
known for international military 
and commercial applications and 
has been widely accepted. It 
provides predictions for ambient of 
0ºC to 125ºC. 
The component database omits 
newer commercial components and 
has not been updated since 1995 
and there are apparently no plans 
for further updates. It penalizes 
non-military components, and 
predicts failure rates of some 
components as worse than actual 
performance. 
Telcordia SR332/ 
Bellcore TR332 
Updated to SR332 in May 2001. It 
provides three prediction methods 
incorporating parts count, lab test 
data and field failure tracking. It 
provides models for many 
component and assembly types and 
five environments applicable to 
telecommunications applications. 
Predictions are limited to ambient 
of 30 ºC to 65 ºC. 
Siemens SN29500 
(derived from  IEC61709) 
SN 29500 provides frequently 
updated failure rate data at 
reference conditions and stress 
models necessary for parts count 
and parts stress predictions. The 
reference conditions adopted are 
typical for the majority of 
applications of components in 
equipment. 
Under these circumstances parts 
count analysis should result in 
realistic predictions.  
The stress models described in this 
standard are used as a basis for 
conversion of the failure rate data 
at reference conditions to the 
actual operating conditions in the 
case that operating conditions 
differ significant from reference 
conditions. 
Field failure rate data are 
determined from components used 
in Siemens products while also 
taking test results from external 
sources into account. 
Page 
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Chapter 3 Methods for Predicting Plant-specific Failure Rates 
As shown in section 2.2, for electronic equipment, several models and methods for reliability 
prediction have been well established and is often based on the parts count technique and the 
part stress technique in (MIL-HDBK-217F, 1991) and similar approaches such as (IEC61709, 
2004), Telcordia SR 332, Siemens SN 29500, FIDES, and RIAC-handbook-217Plus.. 
However, for mechanical and electro-mechanical equipment, there is no generally accepted 
method for reliability prediction.  
 This may be owing to the higher number of, and more complex failure mechanisms. Several 
studies have shown that the reliability of mechanical equipment is sensitive to loading, 
operating mode, and utilization rate. Meanwhile, reliability prediction plays a really critical 
role in the oil and gas industry, which is moving more and more of the traditional topside 
fluid processing systems to the seabed.  This strategy has the potential to give increased 
production from low-energy reservoirs and may also lead to significant cost save. A 
prerequisite is, however, the failures requiring subsea repair interventions will not occur.  
Before an operator accepts to install a new subsea system, he must be convinced that the new 
system has a sufficiently high reliability. The time to the first planned intervention may be 
five years, and even longer, and it is important that the installed system is able to survive this 
period without any failure.  
The operator will usually specify strict reliability requirements for the new subsea system and 
require the supplier to follow an agreed technology qualification program (TQP) during every 
phases of a lifecycle including design, development, and manufacturing phases. These 
reliability requirements may be stated according to (IEC61300-3-4, 2008) and should be 
based on (1) the application of the system; (2) the failure criteria, i.e. what constitutes a 
failure of the system with the intended application; (3) the operating conditions; and (4) the 
environmental conditions. 
System reliability requirements are usually required to be expressed in terms of several 
different quantitative measures, such as the failure rate, the survivor probability, MTTF and 
so forth. Due to the critical role of reliability performance for subsea systems, dependability 
criteria such as PFD therefore have to be evaluated. To perform such analyses, the relevance 
of existing models (e.g., RBD, FT analysis, Markov process) strongly depends on the quality 
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of input data such as failure rates, maintenance characteristics, and common cause 
parameters. (Brissaud et al., 2010). Since OREDA only provides constant failure rates, we 
assume that the subsea systems also have constant failure rates, and denote this by ( )s . The 
corresponding survivor function is ( )
( ) ( ) exp( )
s
SR t t  and the mean time to failure is
( )
1
SMTTF 
 . 
The rationale for the use of constant failure rate (i.e., exponential distribution) model as a 
description of the useful life of some component is reconstructed as follow (Pecht and Nash, 
1994) 
- Data acquired several decades ago were “tainted by equipment acidents, repair 
blunders, inadequate failure reporting of mixed age equipment, defective records of 
equipment operating times, mixed operational environmental...” (Wong, 1991) the 
combination of these effects produce an approximately constant failure rate. 
- For a component during infant and wear out phase, there may be high failure rate 
mechanisms. However, what we deal with are systems during service life where the 
failure rate can be considered constant according to the “bath tub curve” (Rausand 
and Høyland, 2004). 
- The addition of decreasing (infant mortality) failure rate curve with an increasing 
(wear out) failure rate curve can give a crudely constant rate for some period of time, 
even in the absence of external temporally random failure producing events (Holcomb 
and North, 1985). 
Therefore, to obtain application-specific failure rate estimates, various models have been 
suggested, such as the proportional hazards (PH) model and the accelerated failure time 
where the RIFs are included as covariates. The BORA approach and the approach suggested 
by (Brissaud et al., 2011) are both based on a PH model. The BORA project is concerned 
with reliability assessment of safety barriers on offshore oil and gas installations, and is based 
on a set of generic RIFs related to human and organizational factors. The approach by 
(Brissaud et al., 2011) is based on a set of RIFs that are classified according to life cycle 
phases. The estimation of the application-specific failure rate is comparable with the 
approach in MIL-HDBK-217F, but the determination of the multiplicative factors is done in 
another way by a scoring and weighing procedure. 
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However, none of the approaches mentioned above can be used directly to predict the failure 
rate of a new subsea system. Using the PH-model requires extensive data for determining 
covariate values and related parameters. The approach by Brissaud has difficulties in finding 
the influencing functions for the indicators of each influencing factor. The BORA project 
mainly focuses on human and organizational factors that influence the risk of hydrocarbon 
releases. To use the available field data from topside systems, this approach needs some 
extension in different levels, such as scoring and failure analysis. The general principles of 
these approaches, however, have been used to develop a new failure rate prediction method, 
aiming to overcome some of the shortcomings of the existing approaches. 
Therefore, the objective of this chapter is to present several existing methods and models for 
predicting the failure rates of new subsea systems that has been adapted (i.e. “marinized”) 
from known topside systems. Furthermore, compare these approaches with respect to input 
data, accuracy of estimates, amount of devoted sources, and then list the different usage of 
each approach. 
3.1 Failure Rate Prediction with Influencing Factors  
Since new products are often employed under conditions that are also new and many items 
are intended for uses different from typical applications, it is common in many applications to 
modify predicted failure rates by application of environmental and factors. The intent is to 
account for different conditions such as temperature, voltage stress, humidity and so forth. 
The adjustment is done by multiplication of the predicted failure rate by appropriate constants. 
A difficulty encountered in practice is that the resources may not agree on the constants or on 
how to apply them. 
For electronic components, the failure rates are given by analytical functions which directly 
depend on some parameters such as temperature, voltage or electrical intensity. The baseline 
values correspond to reference conditions. The failure rate of a system is usually obtained by 
adding the failure rates of all its components (i.e. parts count analysis).  
This method for failure rate prediction with influencing factors involves both a quantitative 
part allowing integrating potential available data from feedback and a qualitative analysis 
dealing with influencing factors such design, environment, and use to provide more coherent 
and argued results. The main idea behind this method is to use some criteria to fix the failure 
rate within a prior interval, according to the influencing coefficient. To this end, the system is 
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broken up into main component groups. When a component group is susceptible to an 
influencing factor, its baseline failure rate is multiplied by the relevant influencing 
coefficient. The method therefore aims at meeting the following properties: 
- Global enough to be usable for a large number of SIS and influencing factors; 
- A quantitative part has to integrate feedback data when available; 
- A qualitative part has to compensate for a potential lack of feedback data through the 
use of organized expert judgment; 
- Should provide argued results which logically depend on influencing factors; 
- The prospect is for risk analyses to allow more efficient risk managements by acting 
both on systems and influencing factors. 
Although this method has been developed especially for reliability prediction of safety 
instrumented systems (SISs), it may be more generally applied to any system. And the 
prospect is for more efficient risk management by acting both on systems and influencing 
factors. The basic idea is presented in the following section. It is based on the predictive 
models (i.e. parts count analysis and part stress analysis); a quantitative part may integrate 
feedback data to set baseline values; and a qualitative part is inspired by human and 
organization factors frameworks for quantitative risk analysis (QRA) in order to deal with the 
influencing factors.  
Some tools have been developed for the quantitative step, especially for model definition and 
factor selection. For example, a conceptual tree is proposed in (RIAC-HDBK-217Plus, 2006), 
and a reliability influence diagram (RID) in BORA (Aven et al., 2006). Then, in order to set 
the current factors’ state, expert judgment is often used. The BORA approach proposes a 
scale from A (i.e., the best standard in industry) to F (i.e., the worst practice).  
 A reliability influencing factor may be defined as an aspect of a system or an activity that 
affects the reliability performance of this system (Øien, 2001). A RIF is, in principle, a 
theoretical variable, it may or may not be specified how to measure this variable. 
One hypothesis is that the control of probability of failure on demand can be through the 
control of changes in RIFs. Conditions for this hypothesis are that (Vinnem et al., 2012):  
- All relevant RIFs are identified; 
- The RIFs are “measurable”; 
- The relationship between the RIFs and reliability is known. 
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3.1.1 Presentation of the principle 
Only the general steps for this method are briefly introduced, to study it further a detailed 
presentation with several examples can be found in (Brissaud et al., 2010) 
As for the predictive models, the system is divided into several main component groups, and 
the system failure rate is obtained by the sum of the main component groups’ failure rates 
(i.e. as a series system). If the system does not verify serial properties (e.g. redundant 
systems), the approach may be individually applied to each series subsystem, and the 
obtained failure rates are then combined into reliability functions according to the proper 
system architecture, through the system structure function. Notice that having an a priori idea 
of the whole system failure rate is usually more realistic than getting accurate values for all of 
the components. Each component (i.e. main component group) baseline failure rate is 
therefore expressed as a percentage of the whole system baseline failure rate. The effects of 
the influencing factors are included by influencing coefficients. Each coefficient corresponds 
to one factor and vice-versa. If a component is susceptible to an influencing factor, its 
baseline failure rate is multiplied by the corresponding influencing coefficient. The 
coefficient values are defined according to the states of the influencing factors: 
i. If the influencing factor is supposed to be in a medium state according to the 
reliability, the corresponding influencing coefficient is equal to one; 
ii. If the influencing factor is supposed to be in a more suitable state (resp. a less suitable 
state), the corresponding influencing coefficient is smaller than one (resp. greater than 
one). 
These properties can be summed up by the following equations: 
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where s and i are respectively the system’s and the components’ failure rates, according to 
the current states of the influencing factors; ,s mean and ,i mean   
are the system’s and 
components’ baseline failure rates; 
iC is the contribution (in percentage) of component i  in 
the whole system’s baseline failure rate; N is the number of components which make up the 
29 
 
system; 
*
jC is the influencing coefficient which corresponds to the influencing factor j ; and 
iJ  is the set of indices of influencing factors which have an effect on component i . In order 
to have coherent results with a presupposed failure rate scale, a prior interval [ ,min ,max,s s  ] is 
set.  
The model is based on the following assumptions which are summed up in Figure 2: 
- The system baseline failure rate ,s mean is reached when all of the influencing factors 
are, on average, in a medium state; 
- The lower value ,mins (resp. the upper value ,maxs ) of the prior interval is reached 
when all of the influencing factors are, on average, in a defined proportion J of the 
most suitable states (resp. the least suitable states). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1.2 Stepwise procedure 
Step 1: functional analysis and input data 
First of all, it is advisable to delimit the scope of the study. The failure rate has to be precisely 
defined. For example, only the dangerous and undetected failures can be relevant for the 
study, and the unit can be ‘‘per hour’’ or ‘‘per solicitation’’.  
Using available feedback data, reliability data handbooks and, if required, expert judgment, a 
system baseline failure rate, 
.s mean , has to be set. As much as possible, it must fit the medium 
conditions, according to the reliability, in which the system can be. This baseline value is 
surrounded by an interval, [ ,min ,max,s s  ]. It corresponds to the extreme failure rates which it 
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Figure 2 Functional assumption 
30 
 
is possible to observe for this type of system, according to the worst and the most suitable 
influencing factor states.  
FMECA is recommended in order to identify the components of the system which are 
susceptible to different influencing factors. Using the FMECA and, if available, some 
reliability data, the contribution of each component in the system baseline failure rate, 
iC
with 1,...,i N , has to be evaluated. 
Step 2: model definition and influencing factors selection 
A reliability influencing diagram is proposed for model definition and the selection of the 
relevant influencing factors. Four levels are represented from the right to the left, see 
(Brissaud et al., 2010). 
Table 8 provides a sample checklist for influencing factors selection according to the system 
life phases. Human and organizational factors can be added, for example according to the 
taxonomy proposed by (Kim and Jung, 2003). The choice of influencing factors must follow 
some criteria: 
- It is possible to measure or evaluate the states; 
- The state measurements or evaluations must allow differentiation between the studies 
systems; 
- The selected factors are exhaustive enough to explain the observable reliability 
differences. 
An influencing matrix ,N MF  is defined on N M as follows: 
, ( , ) 1N MF i j  if the component i  is susceptible to the influencing factor j , , ( , ) 0N MF i j   
otherwise. 
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Table 8 Sample of checklist for the influencing factor selection 
Category Influencing factors 
Design  System type 
  Work principle 
  Dimensions (sizes, length, volume, weight) 
  Materials 
  Component quality (quality requirements, controls) 
  Special characteristics (supply) 
Manufacture  Manufacturer 
  Manufacture process (procedures, controls) 
Installation  Location (access facilities) 
  Assembly/activation (procedures, controls) 
Use EUC Equipment under control (EUC) type 
  Special characteristics 
 Solicitation Type of load (cycling, random) 
  Frequency of use 
  Loading charge/Activation threshold 
  Electrical load (voltage, intensity) 
 Environment Mechanical constraints ( vibration, friction, shocks) 
  Temperature 
  Corrosion/ Humidity 
  Pollution (dust, impurities) 
  Other stresses (electromagnetism, climate) 
 Requirements Performance requirements 
  Failure modes 
Maintenance  Frequency of  preventive maintenance 
  Quality of preventive maintenance 
  Quality of corrective maintenance 
 
Step 3: indicators selection and graduation 
An indicator is the means to observe the state of an influencing factor. (Øien, 2001) proposes 
some criteria for indicator selection in terms of the amount of data, available sources, and 
relationships with observed factors, validity, and repeatability. For the proposed model, the 
indicators have to be set on a numerical scale. Moreover, the effects of factors (positive or 
negative) will be assumed continuous and monotonous according to the indicator values. For 
qualitative indicators (e.g. manufacturer, type of material), a scale from 0 (i.e., very not 
suitable for the reliability) to 5 (i.e., very suitable for the reliability) is proposed. For 
quantitative indicators (e.g. pressure, voltage, and temperature) the obtained values can be 
directly used if they account for the previous conditions. Otherwise, a multiple level scale has 
to be defined as for the qualitative indicators. 
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Using technical reports, operational data, feedback knowledge, measures, and investigation 
with key staff and so on, three particular levels must be set for each indicator: one which 
represents the medium influencing factor state, two which represent the extreme observable 
values (the least and most suitable values for reliability). The scale for the indicator jI  of the 
influencing factor j  is denoted [ , ,,j lower j upperI I ], and the three particular levels are ,j meanI for 
the medium value, ,j worstI  and ,j bestI for the least and the most suitable values which are 
observable, respectively. 
Step 4: influencing factors rating 
A weight is given to each selected influencing factor. Normalized weight jw for each 
influencing factor j  : 
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It represents the relative potential effect on the susceptible component failure rates, according 
to a change from the least to the most suitable value of the corresponding indicator.  
A rating from 1 to 5 or from 1 to 10 is usually suitable for the proposed model. Feedback 
knowledge, graduating processes, comparisons by pair, tests or expert judgment can be used 
to set weights. The weight of the influencing factor j is denoted by jW , and it is normalized 
using Equation 4. 
Step 5: indicator functions 
In order to deal with uncertainties, especially when expert judgment is required, indicator 
functions aim to represent the current indicator values not as fixed points, but by probability 
density functions. In fact, the indicator values are seldom known precisely and are sometimes 
subject to changes during the system life phases (e.g., temperature, humidity, and load). 
Three types of density function are proposed: 
- Uniform distribution when expert judgment is the main means used to evaluate the 
indicator value (e.g. ‘‘the influencing conditions are supposed to be quite beneficial 
(or not) for the reliability’’); 
- Triangular distribution if the indicator value is deterministic and must be translated on 
a defined scale (e.g. the indicator value is given on a scale from 0 to 5 according to 
the ‘‘degree of suitability’’ for the reliability); 
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- Gaussian distribution when the quantitative indicator value is directly used (e.g. 
pressure, temperature, volume). 
Step 6: influencing functions 
The influencing functions aim at formulating the influencing coefficients according to the 
indicator values. The functions are defined by setting three particular values: one which 
corresponds to a medium indicator value (denoted by ,( )j j meanC I ), two which correspond to 
the least and the most suitable indicator values (resp. ,( )j j worstC I and ,( )j j bestC I ). They can be 
obtained by the equations given in... They take the previous steps into account, including the 
influencing factor weights. Linear relations are then assumed between these particular values. 
These functions are extrapolated all over the indicator scales [ , ,,j lower j upperI I ]. 
The influencing reference coefficients are obtained by solving the following equations: 
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Particular values of the influencing functions: 
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Step 7: final results 
Given the indicator functions ( ( ))j jg I  which express the states of the influencing factors, and 
the influencing functions ( ( ))j jC I which formulate the influencing coefficients, both 
according to the indicator values, the influencing coefficients 
*( )jC are calculated by: 
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Finally, the final system failure rate is obtained by using Equation (1) and (2) with the input 
data from the first step. Note that the density function for indicator values in equation (3) 
mitigates the potential effects on the results of the assumptions from step 6 (i.e. about the 
influencing functions definition). 
This methodology combines a quantitative part to integrate available data, with a qualitative 
analysis to compensate for a potential lack of feedback knowledge. Therefore, unlike 
statistical models, it does not require much reliability feedback data; and differs from 
predictive models, it is not necessary to know the influencing factors’ states and properties 
well. The failure rate evaluations with influencing factors provide argued and coherent result. 
3.2 The BORA Project 
The BORA project has developed a model for both quantitative and qualitative risk analysis 
of platform specific hydrocarbon release frequency based on the use of event trees, fault 
trees, influence diagrams, and RIFs. The RIFs to be used are selected by expert judgment 
from the set of generic RIFs. The state of each RIF is classified into several states and a 
scoring and weighing process is used to determine the effect of each RIF. It is based on the 
initial methodology formulation as well as the experience from the case studies (Vinnem et 
al., 2009). By using BORA it is possible to analyze the effect of safety barriers introduced to 
prevent hydrocarbon releases, and how platform specific conditions of technical, human, 
operational, and organizational risk influencing factors influencing factors influence the 
barrier performance. The BORA project is limited to analysis of hydrocarbon release. 
However, the principle in BORA is relevant for analysis of the consequence barriers as well. 
Several criteria the BORA should fulfill were developed. The criteria were developed as a 
result of discussions of the purpose of the analysis method (Aven et al., 2006). To what 
extent BORA fulfills these criteria are discussed in section 3.2.2. The aim was to develop a 
method that: 
- Facilitates identification and illustration of safety barriers planned to prevent 
hydrocarbon releases. 
- Contributes to an understanding of which factors (technical, human, operational, and 
organizational) that influence the performance of the safety barriers and the risk. 
- Reflects different causes of hydrocarbon releases. 
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- Is suited for quantification of the frequency of initiating events and the performance 
of the barriers. 
- Allows use of available input data as far as possible. 
- Allows consideration of different activities, phases, and conditions. 
- Enables identification of common causes and dependencies. 
- Is practically applicable regarding use of resources. 
- Provides a basis for “re-use” of the generic model in such a way that installation 
specific considerations may be performed in a simple and not too time-consuming 
manner. 
The first step in the development of the model is to define work operations and equipment 
units that may cause a leak. To have a manageable risk model, a limited number of generic 
work operations are defined, covering operations which may directly cause a leak or 
introduce latent failures in the system which may cause a leak at a later point in time. The 
work operations are defined in such a way that they will have as many common 
characteristics as possible, such that the RIFs influencing the probability of making errors 
will be the same or very similar for all specific operations grouped together.  
Further, generic equipment units or equipment packages are defined. This could be, for 
example, a compressor package. For each of these generic equipment packages, the number 
of flanges, valves, instrument connections, etc. is specified. 
Based on this, an “average” platform with an average leak frequency can be established. A 
simplified approach is also proposed, using generic leak frequency data and adjusting these to 
take into account variations in the number of work operations for a specific installation. 
To establish a suitable set of typical work operations, the starting point is to consider the 
types of equipment located in the process areas and which operations are being performed on 
this equipment. Principally, the equipment can be divided into two groups: 
- Hydrocarbon-containing systems/equipment; 
- Other equipment and structures (this will include all sorts of equipment in the process 
areas such as utility equipment, safety systems, electrical equipment, structures, etc.). 
There will be a principal difference between work operations performed on these two groups 
of equipment as work on the second group of equipment only indirectly can lead to a leak of 
hydrocarbons, e.g. as a result of dropped or swinging objects (external impacts). However, 
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when performing work on the hydrocarbon-containing equipment, the operation can lead 
directly to a release, e.g. if a wrong valve is opened. 
The detailed procedure can be found in (Vinnem et al., 2009) and (Aven et al., 2006). The 
generic risk model is shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 A generic risk model, generic information versus amplification-specific information 
According to (Aven et al., 2006), the detailed steps followed BORA project are as follow: 
1) Development of a basic risk model including release scenarios; 
2) Modelling of the performance of safety barriers; 
3) Assignment of industry average probabilities/frequencies and risk quantification 
based on these probabilities/frequencies; 
4) Development of risk influence diagram; 
5) Scoring of risk influencing factors; 
6) Weighting of risk influencing factors; 
7) Adjustment of industry average probabilities/frequencies; 
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8) Recalculation of the risk in order to determine the platform specific risk related to 
hydrocarbon release. 
3.3 “3-step” Model: Functions-material Elements-fault and Failures 
With the development of micro electro-mechanical systems (MEMS), the sensor systems are 
able to combine data acquisitions from physical or chemical properties, and internal data 
processing, to obtain the required information now. According to ISA and IEC international 
standards, such systems are therefore appropriately referred to as “transmitters” instead of 
“sensors” in the process industry (Brissaud et al., 2011). These advance functionalities of 
correction, self-adjustment, self-diagnosis and validation, online reconfiguration, and digital 
bidirectional communication play a role in generic functions: measure, configure, validate, 
and communicate. The use of intelligent transmitters may hence bring several benefits for 
industrialists. However, the “intelligent features” of transmitters give rise to several issues for 
dependability. A discussion on the advantages and disadvantages, with respect to reliability, 
maintainability, and safety, is provided in Table 9. 
Reliability analysis of intelligent transmitters are required to determine safety integrities for 
SISs, but may also be used to obtain input data for self-diagnoses and validation, online 
configuration, and network design. However, even though reliability studies focus on certain 
specific aspects, notably on digital communication, intelligent transmitters are often assumed 
to be “black box” systems and are usually not taken into account for evaluations. In fact, a 
reliability analysis for intelligent transmitters, or more generally for new technology-based 
transmitters, has to deal with several issues: 
i. System complexity, i.e. various interactions between both material elements and 
functions; 
ii. System behavior under faulty conditions which is usually not well known and difficult 
to predict (especially due to programmable units and software); 
iii. Several transmitted data which may be wrong (e.g. measurements, diagnostic 
information), and dependently of each other; 
iv. Little available reliability feedback (e.g. failure modes and reliability data) due to new 
technologies. 
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Table 9 Advantages and disadvantages of intelligent transmitters 
Criterion Pros Cons 
Reliability Self-adjustment may prevent drifts 
or other faults and failures which 
appear with aging. 
The high amount of electronics, 
programmable units and software 
aspects implies new failure causes 
and modes which are usually not 
well known and difficult to predict. 
 Faults and failures may be partly 
compensated using fault tolerant 
strategies (reconfiguration). 
Each fault or failure may affect 
several functions and transmitted 
data (e.g. measurements, 
diagnoses). 
 Digital communication is often 
assumed to be more reliable than 
analogue wires. 
 
Digital communication reliability is 
questioned and may yield common 
cause failures. 
Maintainability Information on drifts, influencing 
factors, charge exceeding, previous 
faults and failures with 
corresponding circumstances etc. 
may be monitored over time and 
used for preventive maintenance. 
Digital communication and online 
reconfiguration can make 
corrective maintenance easier and 
more efficiency. 
 
Specific expertise is required to 
maintain such complex systems. 
Safety Self-diagnoses allow better fault 
and failure coverage, and safe states 
can be defined in more detail. 
Transmitters are increasingly 
becoming “black box” systems. 
 Centralized data processing and 
digital communication may 
improve risk management 
efficiency. 
 
 
These points make qualitative analysis such as FMECA hardly exhaustive for the 
identification of failure modes, with respect to (ii) and (iv), and for handling fault and failure 
interaction, with respect to (i) and (iii). Moreover, the binary reliability models (e.g. RBD and 
FT) are often inappropriate as it, especially due to (ii) and (iii), and transition states 
approaches (e.g. Markov models and Petri nets) have some difficulties in defining state 
boundaries and transition because of (i) and (ii). 
Therefore, the 3-step model (functions-material elements-faults and failures), which is based 
on goal tree-success tree (GTST) approaches to present both the functional and material 
aspects, and includes the faults and failure as a third part for supporting the reliability 
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analysis, is proposed for the reliability analysis of new technology-based transmitters. The 
behavioral aspects are provided by relationship matrices, also denoted master logic diagram 
(MLD), with statistic values which represent direct relationships between system elements. 
Relationship analyses are then proposed to assess the effect of any fault or failure on any 
material element or function. Taking these relationships into account, the probabilities of 
malfunction and failure modes are evaluated according to time. Furthermore, uncertainty 
analyses tend to show that even if the input data and system behavior are not well known, 
these previous results can be obtained in a relatively precise way. 
3.3.1 Modeling of new technology-based transmitters 
A new technology-based transmitter may present two levels of complexity: at the system 
level when various intra and inter relationships exist between material elements and functions; 
at the component level when behavior of units is difficult to define. Models for complex 
systems should be investigated, for example with regard to function-oriented and object-
oriented approach. 
Function-oriented approaches (i.e., functional analyses) allow the system to be analyzed 
according to goals and functions which are to be met or currently performed. They may be 
used in design phase to define functional requirements, or later to understand effective system 
operation. Examples of these approaches include the structure analysis and design technique 
(SADT), the functional analysis system technique (FAST), and the multilevel flow modeling 
(MFM). 
Object-oriented approaches are usually more formal. These approaches may be used to 
describe the static or dynamic structure of a system by defining the material (and software) 
elements and their interactions (i.e. structural analysis). Examples of object-oriented 
approaches include the dynamic flow graph methodology (DFM), fault trees, and the UML 
class diagrams. 
In practice, function-oriented and object-oriented approaches do not reflect opposing 
concepts and, in particular, they can be used as complementary techniques. The model 
developed in this model describes both the system functional and material aspects according 
to a common process. It is based on the GTST approach, combined with MLD. The basic 
idea of GTST is that complex systems can be best described by hierarchical frameworks. The 
system is breaking up according to it qualities (i.e. goals and functions) by the use of a goal 
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tree (GT), and according to its objects (i.e. parts) by the use of a success tree (ST), as 
illustrated in Figure 4.  
goal tree (GT)
             relationship between consecutive levels
                 cross relationships
                         relationships 
                         Between GT and ST
goal
                                               --------------function
        ---------------
other types of 
function
                                               --------------sub-function
success tree (GT)
             relationship between consecutive levels
                 cross relationships
          
                
                         relationships between GT and ST
goal
                                               --------------part
        ---------------
other types of 
part
                                               --------------sub-part
 
Figure 4 Conceptureal goal tree-sucess tree (GTST) with different tpyes of relationships 
The first level of the GT defines the system goal, and the second level is formed by the 
functions which have to be achieved to attain this goal. Additional levels may then be added 
to specify sub-function s, as far as further development is possible without referring to 
objects. Different types of functions may also be distinguished (e.g. main and supporting 
functions) in order to facilitate the analysis of complex systems. Then the ST describes the 
system structure as a collection of objects which are the system parts (hardware, software and 
human) used to achieve the function given in the GT. Similarly to the GT, different levels and 
types of objects may be established.  
In order to represent a compact and transparent fashion the relationships between GT 
functions and ST objects, or between different types of elements within GT or ST, MLD, 
where a simple example is illustrated in Figure 5, can be used. 
41 
 
goal tree (GT)
success tree 
(ST)
  
    master logic
      diagram
       (MLD)
Sub-part
Sub-part
Sub-part
Sub-function Sub-function Sub-function
 
Figure 5 Conceptual GTST-MLD 
The combined GTST-MLD model provides an efficient framework to describe the causal 
relations of complex systems, which is also basis of the 3-step model. The three parts of 3-
stpe model will be discussed in the next section. 
3.3.2 “3-step” model: functions-material elements-fault and failures 
We only provide the conceptual description of this method, for more information and 
example of impalement, see (Brissaud et al., 2011). 
Functional tree 
The first part of this model provides the functional aspect of the system. The top function of 
the functional tree is then denoted by goal function. Classically, the goal function is safety 
function, that is, a function used to prevent hazardous event.  The goal function is split into 
sub-functions on an increasing level of detail. The fulfillment of all these sub-functions 
assures that the goal function is achieved. These relationships may then be specified by “and” 
and “or” gates. In this approach, two types of functions are distinguished: main and 
supporting functions. The global and basic functions are main functions because they directly 
stemmed from the goal function splitting. On the other hand, the supporting functions have 
no final goal as far as users are concerned, but may be required or act on one or several main 
function. 
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Material tree 
The second part of the model provides the material aspects of the system. The material 
elements collect all the objects of the system which are necessary to achieve any of the 
functions given in the functional tree. The material elements are then identified by breaking 
up the system into its parts. The material tree starts with top element which describes the 
whole system to be analyzed and stop when the material elements have been sufficiently 
described according to their distinctive roles in the fulfilment of the functions given in the 
functional tree. Similarly to the functional tree, two types of material elements are used: main 
and supporting material elements. 
Faults and failures (Rausand and Øien, 1996) 
To perform reliability analyses, faults and failures are introduced as a third full part of the 
model, which provides the dysfunctional aspects. According to the definitions from 
(IEC61508, 2010), a fault is an abnormal condition that may cause a reduction in, or loss of, 
the capacity of an entity, while a failure is the termination of the ability to perform a required 
function, or in any way other than as required, a fault is therefore prior to a failure because it 
may or may not result in a failure.  
The faults and failures may be defined and set up according to different categories and levels 
of detail. In this model, a deductive approach may be used to identify possible faults and 
failures that are relevant for any material element given in the material tree (unlike FMECA). 
The authors then model the effects of faults and failures, first by relationships between them 
and material elements, and second by relationship between material elements and functions. 
Both of them are represented by relationship matrices discussed in the next part. 
Relationship matrices (MLD) 
Relationship matrices also denoted by MLD, provide the behavioral aspects of the system. As 
such, they show the way any function is achieved. At this step of the modelling approach, 
qualitative relationships are assumed (no numerical values are used).  
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3.3.3 Relationship analyses based on 3-step model 
Relationship analyses 
The relationship analyses aim to assess the total relationships between any elements (faults 
and failures, material elements, functions) including, for example, the effects of faults and 
failures on functions, taking the direct and indirect relationships into account. Relationship 
event (direct, indirect, and total) are defined. 
The direct relationship events are denoted by: 
  event  directly implies (i.e. without request for any other event) event Bab a bAB A  
The total relationship events between the faults and failures and units are defined by: 
   , , , ,( )d m d m p d p p mDMtot DM DP PM  (13) 
which means an occurrence of fault for failure d (directly or indirectly) implies a failed state 
of unit m. 
It is often more relevant to analyze the global functions rather than the basic functions. Then, 
the total relationship between faults and failures and global functions are denoted by: 
   , ( ) , ( )d g f g d f gDG DF  (14) 
which means that an occurrence of fault or failure d (directly or indirectly) implies a 
malfunction of global function f, where f(g) is the set of basic functions f that have to be 
fulfilled to achieve the global function g. 
 It is then possible to express the probability of global function g malfunctioning, as follow: 
  ,[ ] [ ( )]g d d d gP G P D DG  (15) 
Furthermore, a simple way to compute the total relationship values is then to use the 
following expression: 
  ,[ ] [ / ]d g g d dP DG P G D D   (16) 
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This is, if the fault or failure d occurs and no other, the global function g malfunctions with a 
probability equal to ,[DG ]d gP . The value can therefore be interpreted as the individual impact 
measure of fault or failure d on global function g. 
Probabilities of malfunction and failure modes 
The probabilities of malfunction and failure modes are assessed according to the following 
assumptions: 
- The direct relationship events are independent, and the corresponding probabilities are 
time-independent; 
- The occurrences of faults and failures are independent, and the corresponding 
probabilities are time-dependent and thus denoted [ ](t)P Dd ; 
- No maintenance action is performed during the study time. 
The probabilities of the global functions malfunctioning at time t may then be assessed by: 
 
, ,( [ ] [ ]( ) (1 [ ]( ))) [ ]( ) ( [ ] [ ]( ))d g d g d g dd ddP DG P D t P D t P G t P DG P D t       (17) 
The probabilities of failure modes at time t may then be obtained, for example by a fault tree-
based approach, as in the previous analyses. 
Uncertainty analyses 
Input data uncertainty is a substantial issue for reliability amylases. It has been widely 
investigated in many references, especially by comparing the use of several sources, Monte 
Carlo simulation, method of moments, Bayesian networks, and other approaches such as 
fuzzy sets and possibility theory, evidence theory, and interval analyses. In fact, most of the 
models for reliability analysis first require the system’s response to events to be strictly 
defined. 
A probabilistic approach is preferred because mathematical criteria such as variances can be 
used to assess the uncertainties in result, compared with the uncertainties in inputs. 
3.4 Failure Rate prediction of New Subsea Systems 
Most of the new subsea equipment or systems are adapted from similar, well known topside 
(i.e. on the platform) system and the industry often talks about “marinization” of topside 
technology. Reliability information for topside systems is available from the OREDA 
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handbook and the OREDA database (for participating companies). This information cannot 
be used directly for new subsea systems, because of design modifications, different 
environmental stresses, and different maintenance conditions. The reliability information in 
OREDA is presented as a constant failure rate, together with additional information related to 
failure modes, failure descriptors/mechanisms, and components that contributed to the system 
failures. Currently, no practical method is available for extrapolating the available reliability 
data from similar and known systems and come up to a failure rate prediction for new system 
operating in a different environment. 
This is a practical approach to reliability prediction of new subsea systems based on available 
operational data from similar, known systems from the topside environment and a 
comparison between two systems. The application if the approach is illustrated by an 
example of a subsea pump. 
As noted previously, most reliability data sources assume that the items have constant failure 
rates and that failures in a population of identical items occur according to a homogeneous 
Poisson process (HPP) where the time t is the accumulated time in service. Design variations 
and operational and environmental conditions may be accounted for by including covariates 
into the model. In some application areas (including the subsea oil and gas industry), the 
covariates are sometimes referred to as reliability-influencing factors (RIFs). A RIF is a 
relatively stable condition, which by being changed will increase or reduce the failure rate of 
the item. In (Ascher and Feingold, 1984), the authors listed 18 RIFs that influence the failure 
behavior of a repairable system. NSWC-1110 considers the effects of the environmental RIFs 
at the lowest part level of mechanical systems (Rahimi and Rausand, 2013). 
3.4.1 Failure rate provision for new systems 
How the subsea environment influences a system’s failure rate will generally depend on the 
application of the system and its internal and external environmental conditions. Items that 
are not directly in contact with the subsea environment are mainly affected by internal 
stresses, while items that are in direct contact with the subsea environment are also affected 
by external stresses. Failure rate estimates for topside systems are available from (OREDA, 
2009). Other sources, such as MechRel and the (RIAC-HDBK-217Plus, 2006) handbook may 
also give supplementary information. In many applications, reliability prediction is often 
performed under the assumption that the underlying failure time is exponential distributed. It 
is known that the accuracy of a prediction often depends on the completeness of product 
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information and the appropriateness of a model for the underlying lifetime distribution (Jin et 
al., 2010). 
The objective of this approach is to use the available topside data to predict the failure rate of 
a similar subsea system. Several categories of data and information are required. 
 Technical data are usually s supplied by system manufacturers and are necessary for 
understanding the system functions and for developing system models. Based on this 
type of data, similarities among or between systems can be identified. 
  Environmental data provide information about the operating conditions for the 
system and needs to be incorporated into the reliability analyses. Subsea 
environmental meta-data and ocean data can be used for a better understanding of 
influencing factors. 
 Operational and maintenance data (field data) are collected under actual operating 
conditions by the customers, and are plant/system specific. 
 Expert judgment plays a central role in the provision of data for new applications. 
Experts may possess valuable knowledge that can supplement the recorded data and 
provide important input to decision-makers. 
 Reliability prediction methods are required to find or develop a suitable method for a 
more realistic estimation. 
3.4.2 Stepwise procedure 
This approach can be used early in the product development process, i.e. the design and 
development phases. During the operational phase, the predicted failure rate from previous 
phases has to be updated based on the real data that are collected. 
Step 1. New system familiarization 
The intended application of the new subsea system must be clearly defined and its physical 
boundaries and operational and environmental conditions must be specified. A suggestion on 
what may be included in the description of the system and its environment is given in 
(BS5760-4, 1986). It is recommended to represent the system as a hierarchical structure of 
subsystems and maintainable items. A maintainable item is a lowest level item in the system 
hierarchy at which maintenance is carried out. 
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(DNV-RP-A203, 2011) suggests that a critical items list is prepared, specifying key issues, 
such as materials, dimensioning loads, capacities, frequency of operation, and so on. The 
description may be in the form of drawings, text, data, or other relevant formats.  
Step 2. Identification of failure modes and failure causes 
A failure mode and failure cause analysis of the new subsea system should be carried out. A 
full FMECA is not required, but may already have been prepared for other purposes at this 
stage of the system development process. All potential failure modes must be considered, 
together with the failure causes and mechanisms that may contribute to each failure mode. 
The assessment must cover all operational modes. The failure modes and failure cause 
analysis may be based on a worksheet as shown in Figure 1. Some columns in the worksheet, 
such as ‘‘maintainable item’’ or ‘‘function’’, are not used specifically in the approach or in 
the calculations, but they are necessary in order to get insight related to failures, influencing 
factors, and so on. It is further recommended to establish an influence diagram to illustrate 
the potential causes, as shown in Table 10. 
Table 10 Failure mode and failure cause worksheet 
Description of unit Description of failure 
Ref no. Maintainable 
item 
Function Operational 
mode 
Failure 
mode 
Failure 
cause 
Detection 
of failure 
       
 
Step 3. Reliability information acquisition for the similar known system; comparison of the new 
and known system  
It is assumed that data are available from a known topside system that performs similar 
functions and has a similar design and structure as the new system. Therefore, as much 
reliability information about the known topside system as possible should be acquired form 
OREDA. The information includes: 
- Failure modes; 
- Failure rate estimates for each failure mode, including confidence intervals; 
- Failure descriptors, i.e. failure mechanisms and other factors contributing to each 
failure mode (qualified); 
- Maintainable items contributing to each failure mode (qualified). 
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Let ( )T denote the constant total failure rate given in OREDA for the topside system. The 
failure rate for failure mode 
iFM is denoted by
( )T
i , for 1,2,...,i n , such that
( ) ( )
1
nT T
ii
 

 , 
when the failure modes are disjoint. The failure modes may not be completely independent 
since they can have several failure causes in common. The relationship among reliability-
influencing factors, failure causes, failure modes, and the total failure rate can be illustrated 
as shown in Figure 6. 
RIF1
RIF2
RIFp
Reliability-
influencing 
factors
Failure 
causes
Failure 
modes
FC1
FC2
FCr
FM1
FM2
FMq
FMq+1
FMn
Total failure 
rate
&
 
Figure 6 Factors contributing to the total failure rate of the subsea system 
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FCr+1
FCm’
FC1
FCr
FCr+1
FCm
FCq+1
FCn’
FCq
FC1
FCq+1
FCn
Total topside 
failure rate
Total subsea 
failure rate
 
Figure 7 Subsea and topside system comparison 
The new and known systems are compared with respect to structural, operational, and 
environmental conditions, and failure modes and failure causes (including failure 
mechanisms), and similarities and differences are recorded. The new and known system may 
not have exactly the same failure modes, and differences must be listed and described. Figure 
7 illustrates the comparison of failure modes and failure causes between the new and the 
known systems. The dashed rounded rectangles and arrows indicate that they belong to the 
topside system, the thick rounded rectangles and arrows indicate that they are similar for both 
the offshore and the subsea systems, and the thin rounded rectangles and arrows indicate that 
they belong only to the subsea system. 
Step 4. Selection of relevant RIFs 
The RIFs influence the reliability, and when a RIF is changed, the failure rate of the system 
may change. Our goal is to determine how much the failure rate changes by evaluating the 
RIF’s influences on the failure causes. The RIFs that are relevant for the new subsea system 
are identified based on the physical insight in step 3, combined with expert judgment.  It is 
typically assumed that it is possible to measure or evaluate the states of the RIFs. 
Table 11 provides a list of generic RIFs, partly based on the checklist presented in Table 8. 
These RIFs are related to design and manufacturing, operation and maintenance, and 
environmental factors. This table can be used as a checklist to establish a set of specific RIFs 
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for the particular topside and subsea systems. The selection of specific RIFs should be done 
by experts. 
Table 11 Generic RIFs 
Category RIFs 
Design and manufacturing System structure, Materials, Dimensions, Loads and 
capacities, Quality (manufacturing process, installation, 
logistics, assembly…) 
Operational and maintenance  Functional requirements, Time in operation, Mechanical 
constrains, Frequency of maintenance, Maintenance 
policy, Accessibility for maintenance 
Environmental External Temperature, Location of operation, 
Pressure, Corrosive environment, Pollution 
Internal Pressure, Sand particles in the fluid, 
Chemical content 
 
Furthermore, the specific RIFs must be ranked by experts according to their importance for 
each failure caused of the new subsea system. This can be done as repeated pairwise ranking 
by deciding whether or not 
1,
RIFj k is more important than 2,RIFj k , for all pairs 1 2( , )k k , for 
failure cause FC j . The experts should next allocate weights to the carious RIFs for failure 
causes of the subsea system, such that kj  is the weight of RIFk for FCj. The weights should 
indicate the relative importance of the RIFs and be scaled such that 
1
1
p
kjk


  for
1,2,...,j r . 
The selected RIFs are added to the influencing diagram, as shown in Figure 6, to illustrate 
their influences on the failure causes. 
Step 5. Scoring the effects of the RIFs 
The RIFs selected in step 4 may be different for the topside and the subsea system therefore, 
it is necessary to make clear description in order to help comparing the effects if these RIFs 
on the failure causes. 
To indicate which of the p selected RIFs that influence the failure causes of the topside and 
subsea systems, the indicators 
( )T
kjv and 
( )S
kjv  are used, where the topside indicator 
( )T
kjv  is 
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1, if RIF  has effection (topside) failure cause FC( ) 0, if RIF  has no effection (topside) failure cause FCk jk jTkjv   
And the subsea indicator 
( )S
kjv  is, 
1, if RIF  has effection (subsea) failure cause FC( ) 0, if RIF  has no effection (subsea) failure cause FCk jk jSkjv   
The effects each RIF has on the subsea system are then compared with the effects the same 
RIF has on the topside system. For each failure cause FC j and RIFk , an influence score kj  is 
used to indicate how much higher/lower influence RIFk  has on failure cause FC j  for subsea 
system compared with the topside system it is suggested to use seven-points scale in Table 12 
to assign the score, but other scoring scales may be used if deemed more realistic. 
Table 12 A seven-point scale for scoring RIFs 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Much 
lower 
effect 
Significantly 
lower effect 
Slightly 
lower 
effect 
No 
difference 
Slightly 
higher 
effect 
Significantly 
higher effect 
Much 
higher 
effect 
 
For example, the score +3 indicates that RIFk has a much higher influence on failure cause 
FCj subsea compared with topside. When
( ) 1Tkjv  , all the seven points are applicable for 
scoring, while
( ) 0Tkjv  , means that only three of the seven points (i.e. only positive points 
indicating higher influence) have to be considered. The scoring requires detailed physical and 
operational insight and judgments from experts.  
Step 6. Weighing the contribution of the failure causes to failure modes 
How much the failure cause FCj contributes to failure mode FMi for the topside is specified 
as a weight
( )T
jiw . The weights can be easily deduced from the data tables in OREDA. The 
corresponding weights for the subsea system have to be determined based on expert 
judgments, technical reports, operational data, feedback knowledge, interview of key staff, 
and comparison procedure in step 3, which are denoted by
( )S
jiw . The weights should be scaled 
such that 
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( )
1
1 for 1,2,...,
r
S
ji
j
w i q

   (18) 
Where q is the number of failure modes that is similar for both subsea and topside system. 
Step 7. Determination of the failure rate for similar failure mode 
The failure rates for the failure modes of the subsea system are determined by adjusting the 
corresponding failure rates for the topside system based on the influences of the RIFs. This 
approach is similar to the BORA approach. It is assumed that the failure rate for failure mode 
FMi in the subsea environment can be expressed by the failure rate to the corresponding FMi 
in the topside environment as 
  ( ) ( ) (1 ) for 1,2,...,S Ti i i i q       (19) 
where 1i    is a constant scaling factor that needs to be determined. The weight can also be 
interpreted as the conditional probability, that is 
  
( ) Pr(the failure is caused by FC FM  has occured)Sji ji iw   (20) 
It is suggested that this influence is determined as a weighted average of the scores of the 
RIFs that influence FCj, and where the RIFs are weighted according to the relative 
importance of the RIFs, such that 
 
 
( )
1
 for 1,2,...,
3
p
kjS
j kj kj
k
j r

  

    (21) 
The reason why the weighted average score is divided by 3 comes from the highest score in 
Table 12 and used for normalization.  
The scaling factor 
i  can be calculated by  
 
 
( )
1
 for 1,2,...,
r
S
i i ji j
j
c w i q 

     (22) 
Where 
ic a constant scaling factor that will be specified later in this step. 
Given the assumption that the failure rate ( )Si  of the subsea system with respect to failure 
mode FMi can be delimited such that 
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( ) ( ) ( )
, ,,
S S S
i Low i High i      
Where the boundary values can be determined based on ( )Ti . The boundaries are defined by 
the two factors min, max, and i i   for each failure mode such that 
  
( ) ( ) ( )
min, max,
T S T
i i i i i         (23) 
 
Solving equations above, we can get 
 
 
( )
min, max,
1
1
r
S
i i ji j i
j
c w  

      (24) 
Furthermore, they suggest that  
 
 
( )
min. 1
( )
1
( )
, 1
1  when 0
0 when 0  for 1,2,...,
1 when 0 
r S
i ji jj
r S
i ji jj
r S
max i ji jj
w
c w i q
w
 

 



   


   

   




 (25) 
Then the result becomes 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
1
(1 ) for 1,2,...,
r
S T S
i i i ji j
j
c w i q  

       (26) 
Step 8. Determination of failure rates of new failure modes, calculation of new total failure rate 
The failure rates of failure modes that are only relevant to the subsea system cannot be 
obtained from the topside system. Therefore, the values of 
( ) ( )
1 ,...,
S S
q n  have to be determined 
by expert judgments, technical reports, and limited operational data from other similar 
systems operating in subsea environment. Finally, the total failure rate for the new subsea 
system can be calculated by  
 
 
( ) ( )
1
n
S S
Total i
i
 

  (27) 
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3.4.3 Applicability testing by a simple example 
To verify the applicability of this approach, we consider a new subsea pump that is used to 
move fluids in a pipeline as an example of implement. The pump consists of components that 
are normally found in standard topside pumps, but the design and materials are improved and 
the application is new. The information about this “new” pump is based on open sources as 
development of new technology for the subsea industry is confidential. Moreover, subsea 
systems are commonly highly complex, and the number of failure modes, failure causes and 
RIFs therefore can be so high that we are not able to cover all of them in this thesis. The 
purpose of this example is to demonstrate the approach rather than present a realistic case 
study, thus it does not reach a final result that expresses the realistic failure rate of the new 
subsea pump. 
Step 1: New system familiarization.  
The pump is integrated in a single pressure-containing cartridge with statistic seals towards 
the environment. The pump is multi-stage pump with several impellers connected in series. 
This enables a higher pressure increase within a limited area. Critical features for this pump 
are as follows: (i) high reliability is required (i.e., all components require special 
considerations); (ii) the maintenance philosophy is not standard (i.e., not similar to topside 
application); (iii) the pump fluid is only partly conventional, and its properties may change 
over time. 
Step 2: Identification of failure modes and failure causes.  
In this example, we only consider the most important failure modes, and failure causes that 
have a significant contribution to corresponding failure modes. The selected failure modes 
and failure causes are listed in Table 13. Furthermore, to illustrate relevant relationships an 
influencing diagram is established in Figure 8. 
Table 13 Important failure modes and failure causes of the new subsea pump 
Category Description 
Failure modes Fail to start on demand(FTS) 
 Low output (LOO) 
 Spurious stop (UST) 
Failure causes Mechanical failure-general (MFG) 
Blockage/plugged (BLK) 
Instrument failure-general (IFG) 
Control failure (CF) 
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Step 3: Reliability information acquisition for the similar known system; comparison of the new 
and the known system.  
As the defined physical boundary of the known topside pump in OREDA, the items made up 
it are: pump unit, power transmission, control and monitoring, lubricating system, 
miscellaneous. 
To simplify the analysis procedure, we assume that all the important failure modes of the 
subsea pump are similar to the topside pump. The same for failure causes, although with 
different effects. 
Step 4: Selection of relevant RIFs.  
According to the generic RIFs list in Table 11, the selected RIFs are: location of operation, 
frequency of maintenance, and loads and capacity. The weights of RIFs for each related 
failure cause are considered as equal. 
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Figure 8 Reliability influencing diagram for the new subsea pump 
*MFG: Mechanical failure-general; BLK: Blockage/plugged; IFG: Instrument failure-general; CF: Control 
failure; FTS: Fails to start on demand; LOO: Low output; UST: Spurious stop 
Step 5: Scoring the effects of the RIFs.  
The assessment of the RIFs for the topside and the subsea pump are summarized in Table 14. 
Table 14 Scoring of RIFs for subsea pump by comparison with the topside pump 
  Failure causes 
RIFs Category Interpretation  MFG BLK IFG CF 
Frequency of maintenance TS Every year Relevance 1 0 1 0 
 SS Every 5 years Relevance 1 0 1 0 
   Score 1 0 0 0 
Loads and capacity TS Normal Relevance 0 1 0 0 
 SS Up to 2 times  Relevance 0 1 0 0 
   Score 0 0 0 0 
Location of operation TS Offshore  Relevance 0 0 1 1 
 SS Seabed  Relevance 0 0 1 1 
   Score 0 0 -2 1 
*RIF: Reliability influencing factor; MFG: Mechanical failure-general; BLK: Blockage/plugged; IFG: 
Instrument failure-general; CF: Control failure; TS: Topside; SS: Subsea. 
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The scores in this table are obtained based on Table 12, for example, the effect of location of 
operation on IFG for a subsea pump seems to be significantly lower than a topside pump, 
because the design of the subsea pump which located in a capsule, and therefore gives the 
value of “-2”. 
Step 6: Weighing the contribution of the failure causes to failure modes.  
The contributing weight of each failure cause to each failure mode for the topside pump is 
available in OREDA and from step 3. The new contributing weights for the subsea pump 
have to be determined. These are summarized in Table 15. 
Table 15 The old and new contribution weights of failure causes for each failure modes 
Failure 
modes 
Failure causes 
MFG BLK IFG CF MFC BLK IFG CF 
Sum 
Old contributing weights New contributing weights 
FTS 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 
LOO 0.67 0.33 - - o.75 0.25 - - 1 
UST - - 0.5 0.5 - - 0.4 0.6 1 
*MFG: Mechanical failure-general; BLK: Blockage/plugged; IFG: Instrument failure-general; CF: Control 
failure. 
Step 7: Adjustment of old failure rates, calculation of total failure rate.  
It is assumed that 𝜃𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝑖 = 0.3 and 𝜃𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑖 = 1.1 for all the failure modes. The NJ,KI, and 
updated failure rats for failure modes of the subsea pump are summarized in Table 16, Table 17, 
and Table 18. 
Table 16 The values of for each failure cause 
Failure causes MFG BLK IFG CF 
 0.33 0 -0.33 0.33 
 
Table 17 The values of min and max for each failure mode 
𝜃𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝜃𝑚𝑎𝑥 Failure 
modes 
𝜅𝑖 
0.3 1.1 FTS 0.033 
0.3 1.1 LOO 0.025 
0.3 1.1 UST 0.0066 
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Table 18 The old and updated failure rates for each failure mode 
Failure modes FTS LOO UTS 
Failure rates for topside pump 40,73 81,46 101,82 
Failure rates for subsea pump 40,86441 81,66365 101,8872 
Step 8: Determination of failure rates, calculation of new total failure rate.  
Since we have not analysis all failure modes, failure causes, and RIFs, we are not able to 
obtain any failure rate estimate for the subsea pump. 
3.5 Discussion 
All of the methods have their limitations and none of these methods mentioned above can be 
used directly to predict the failure rate of a new subsea system. 
For example, the BORA approach is concerned with reliability assessment of safety barriers 
on offshore oil and gas installations, and considers a set of generic RIFs related to human and 
organizational factors. However, it requires extensive data to determine covariate values and 
related parameters. Besides, it mainly focuses on human and organizational factors that 
influence the risk of hydrocarbon releases. To use available field data from topside systems, 
this approach needs some extension in different levels, such as scoring and failure analysis. 
The “3-step” model which is also based on PH model considers a set of RIFs that are 
classified according to life cycle phases. The estimation of the application-specific failure 
rate is comparable with the approach in MIL-HDBK-217F, but the determination of the 
multiplicative factors is done in another way by scoring and weighing procedure. However, it 
has difficulties in finding the influencing functions for the indicator.  
The approach proposed by (Rahimi and Rausand, 2013) gives us a practical way to obtain the 
failure rate prediction for some new applications that can be considered as “marinization” of 
similar topside technology. Investigations of major accidents show that technical, human, 
operational, as well as organizational factors influence the accident sequences. However, this 
approach has considered only technical safety systems. 
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Chapter 4 A New Procedure to Predict the Plant-specific Failure Rates 
The main objective of this chapter is to present a new approach for the failure rates prediction 
of plant-specific equipment, which could minimize the deficiencies of the traditional 
reliability prediction methods. The proposed approach takes advantage of the potentiality of 
different reliability prediction approaches. It combines the use of FMECA, reliability 
influence diagrams and hierarchical RIF model to predict failure rates using the available data 
from similar topside equipment. This approach makes it possible to analyze how plant-
specific conditions of technical, human, as well as operational RIFs influence the predicted 
failure rates. It also allows realizing more realistic reliability prediction in case of new 
products or products without historic data. The approach is developed for but not limited to 
new subsea equipment. 
This method tries to combine the evaluation made by means of a prediction model and the 
collection of results from the field and, when possible, with failure analysis. The analysis 
flow concerning the proposed reliability method is presented in Figure 9 (Cassanelli et al., 
2005). 
Collect information about 
the electronic system
Empirical model 
prediction techniques
Collect tests and 
accelerated tests data
Collect field return data 
about similar product
Graphical and numerical 
analysis of field data
Graphical and numerical 
analysis of tests data, 
HALT, FMEA, FTA 
physics of failure
K correction factor
 
Figure 9 Analysis flow 
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4.1 Stepwise procedure 
All aspects of the model are addressed in a principal manner, in order to illustrate the features 
of the model and its limitation. In order to make it easy to compare this new approach with 
existing models and methods, we are going to use the same case as in (Rahimi and Rausand, 
2013), which is a simple multistage electric motor driven pump with power less than 500kW. 
Step 1: new system familiarization 
The study object is a pump that used to move fluids in a pipeline. The pump is made of 
components that are normally found in standard topside pumps, but the design and materials 
are improved and the application is new.  The tasks in this step are almost the same as in the 
approach presented in (Rahimi and Rausand, 2013).  
Step 2: functional analysis 
It is necessary to delimit the scope of the study: which system to be applied and for what 
functions to achieve in the beginning. To this purpose, we first define the physical boundary 
of the system and analyze the critical failure modes and their corresponding failure causes, 
for which FMECA is recommended to be used. The physical boundary of the known topside 
is specified in (OREDA, 2009). The subunits of a topside pump are: pump unit, power 
transmission, control and monitoring, lubricating system, impellers, miscellaneous.  
Step 3: reliability information acquisition from similar systems 
The input data is collected from past experience data on system with a similar and 
comparable technology. The data are evaluated for form, fit and function compatibility with 
the new subsea system. If the new system is an item that is undergoing an enhancement, the 
collected data will provide a good basis for comparison to the new system. If the system does 
not have a direct similar item, the lower level similar circuits can be employed. 
All the maintainable items related to each subunit are listed in detail in (OREDA, 2009). 
Several reliability data tables for topside pumps are also provided in (OREDA, 2009). For 
each type of pump, a main data table gives the failure rates for the different failure modes, 
together with 90% confidence bounds. Another table lists the relative contribution from each 
failure cause to the failure rate. 
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Step 4: model definition and selection of RIFs 
As discussed in step 3, we try to consider not only technical factors, but also operational, 
human, and organizational factors, however, not including the influence due to design (e.g., 
system structure and material).  
To analyze the RIFs in a more comprehensive way, we use the hierarchical model of RIFs 
presented in (Vinnem et al., 2012) as an improvement, where the RIF identification process 
results in a RIF structure of two levels. Level 1 consist RIFs with a theoretical and empirical 
justified direct influence on one or more of the failure causes. Level 2 represents different 
aspects of management that have a theoretically and empirically justified influence on the 
RIFs on level 1. The two-levels-RIF structure is chosen to emphasize and elucidate the 
underlying impact of managerial decisions on the probabilities of failure modes. Only the 
RIFs on level 1 are in our model considered to influence the probability of failure causes 
triggered. RIFs on level 2 are considered only to influence RIFs on level 1, and may regarded 
as a means to reduce the uncertainty implied by observations of RIFs only on level 1 with 
associated scores. Scores and influence from RIFs on level 2 are used together in order to 
provide information about the true value of the RIFs. To make the calculation procedure 
simpler, we are not going to score the influence from RIFs on level 2. 
Step 5: RIF’s importance measurement (Vinnem et al., 2012). 
It is important to define the weight of each RIF for corresponding failure cause. In the 
approach presented in (Rahimi and Rausand, 2013), the weights of RIFs for each related 
failure cause are considered as equal. Similarly, in the BORA model, the RIF’s structure used 
was one level structure, where all the RIFs were given the same structural importance. 
However, it is obviously not realistic. 
Analysis of importance is well known in fault tree analysis, using which, we could find the 
most effective and economic solution to reliability improvement. It is usually established for 
classical sensitivity analysis. There are many important measures in the literature. We will 
use a Birnbaum like measure of reliability importance, which is one of the most commonly 
used measures, see (Rausand and Høyland, 2004). The Birnbaum’s measure,𝐼(𝑖)
𝐵  is defined as 
the change in probability (denoted by 𝑄0) of top event due to the change in unreliability of 
component I (denoted by 𝑞𝑖), which can be expressed by 𝐼(𝑖)
𝐵 =
𝜕𝑄0
𝜕𝑞𝑖
 . If  𝐼(𝑖)
𝐵  is large, a small 
change in the reliability of component i will result in a comparatively large change in the top 
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event. Similarly, the changes in RIFs with higher importance will result in bigger influences 
on the system failure rate.  
The next challenge, therefore, is to develop a Birnbaum-like measure that could be applied 
for the RIFs. Since the RIFs are random variables not parameters as in fault tree or event tree, 
we need another definition of a “small change” in the value of the RIF. We define this change 
in a RIF in terms of a shift in the expected value of the RIF. Let 𝜋𝑗  be the posterior 
distribution of 𝑅𝐼𝐹𝑖, and 𝛥𝐸𝑗 be the change in the expected value of 𝜋𝑗. Further let F be the 
frequency of the critical failure modes, (e.g., failure to start) where F depends on the 
posterior distribution of the RIFs, and in particular𝑅𝐼𝐹𝑗. A Birnbaum-like measure for the 
importance of 𝑅𝐼𝐹𝑗 is then given by: 
  𝐼𝑅𝐼𝐹
𝐵 (𝑗) = [𝐹(𝜋𝑗
𝛥) − 𝐹(𝜋𝑗)]/𝛥𝐸𝑗 (28) 
To interpret the philosophy behind the Birnbaum-like measure in an easier way, we can recall 
the meaning of it in fault tree, where reducing the basic event failure probability with 𝛥𝑞𝑖, 
system failure rate may be reduced by 𝐼(𝑖)
𝐵 ∗ 𝛥𝑞𝑖. Similarly, the change in the system failure 
rate could be calculated by the combination of the Birnbaum-like measure 𝐼(𝑖)
𝐵  and the shift in 
the expected value of the RIF given by 𝐼𝑅𝐼𝐹
𝐵 (𝑗) ∗ 𝛥𝐸𝑗. 
The advantage of having this knowledge is that by focusing on the measures that have an 
influence on the RIFs with highest importance, one could expect that these measures would 
also have the largest effect on the overall system reliability. The detailed presentation can be 
found in (Vinnem et al., 2012) and (Gran et al., 2012). 
Step 6: scoring the effects of RIFs 
The scores indicate how much lower or higher are the effects of RIFs on a subsea pump 
compared with a topside pump. This is usually evaluated by expert judgment. 
Step7: weighting the contribution of failure cause to the failure mode 
The contributing weight of each failure cause to each failure mode for the topside pump is 
available in (OREDA, 2009) and in step 3. 
Step 8: modeling of dependencies in terms of fault tree 
(Podofillini et al., 2009) and (Čepin, 2008) reviewed the models for assessing human 
reliability analysis dependence. We will use the same dependence levels (i.e., zero, low, 
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moderate, high and complete) to analysis our case. For each of these levels it corresponds a β 
factor which is the conditional probability of a subsequent failure given a first failure. It is 
commonly agreed that common cause failures is a more important issue after a component 
failure compared to our situation. Therefore, we assume lower common cause influence than 
found in the literature. 
One way to include the common cause effects in the modeling is to do a recalculation of the 
minimal cut sets in the fault trees. 
For example, if a minimal cut set comprises the following basic events: P=Planning error; 
CP=Control planning error; E=Execution error, CE=Control execution error. And let 𝛽𝐶𝑃|𝑃 
and 𝛽𝐶𝐸|𝐸  denote common cause factors for controlling the plan, and controlling the 
execution respectively. We may use the following approximation to find the probability of 
failure contribution from this minimal cut set: 
  𝑄𝑗 = [𝑞𝑃𝑞𝐶𝑃 + 𝛽𝐶𝑃|𝑃min(𝑞𝑃, 𝑞𝐶𝑃)] + [𝑞𝐸𝑞𝐶𝐸 + 𝛽𝐶𝐸|𝐸 min(𝑞𝐸 , 𝑞𝐶𝐸)] (29) 
where we assume there is no common cause effects between planning and execution, and the 
β-values are found by equation: 
   
𝛽 = 𝛽0∏𝑤𝑖
𝑆𝑖
𝑖
 
(30) 
where 𝜷𝟎 is the baseline common cause factor, and 𝒘𝒊 is the weight of factor i. 
Step 9: modeling of interactions between RIFs 
The influence of one RIF on the failure cause in assumed to be independent of the influence 
of the other RIFs in the models presented in chapter 3. However, there might be causes where 
a high score of one or more RIFs balances or neutralizes the low score of other RIFs (Vinnem 
et al., 2012). 
Further explanation is that, the effect of a low (bad) observation of a RIF would be higher if 
one or more of other RIFs also have a low observation. Similarly it can be argued that the 
effect of one good RIF would be increased if one or more RIFs are good. The latter might 
represent a problem in the modelling where a RIF is represented in characters. To allow for a 
neutralization effect, the model has to be extended to also have negative characters, or one 
has to set the weight of such a set of RIFs equal to zero (Gran et al., 2012). The interaction 
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effect will be triggered if both the involved RIFs have a low observation, and a weight (low, 
medium or high) is multiplied by the original weights.   
The arguments in the modelling of interaction effects are as follows: interaction effects are 
only modelled between RIFs on level 1 due to the fact that no level 1 RIFs are influenced by 
more than one level 2 RIFs in the reliability influence diagram. Further the influence of the 
level 1 RIFs on the probability of failure cause triggered are essentially determined by a 
weighted sum of the level 1 RIFs, i.e., 
  𝑟 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑖  (31) 
where 𝑟𝑖 is a score of RIFs on level 1. 
In the modelling of interaction effects subsets of the total set of RIFs are considered to 
represent a potential for interaction. However, we have assumed that interaction effects only 
come into play when all the RIFs in a subset have an observation worse than the average RIF 
score. We only consider subsets of two or three RIFs. In order to simplify the modelling of 
interaction effects we assign a weight, 𝑤𝐼 of the interaction effect which is relative to the 
weight of the various RIFs in the interaction subset, say I. For each RIF in the subset I we 
then may find a total weight of the RIF in addition the original weight of the RIF, i.e., 
  𝑤𝐼,𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖𝑓 (32) 
where 𝑤𝑖 is the original weight of the RIF, and f is a correction factor. If one or more of the 
RIFs have an observation better than the average RIF score we set 𝑓 = 0. If all the RIF scores 
in I have the worst score, we set 𝑓 = 1. For scores between we apply a linear transformation: 
  𝑓 = (∑𝑟 − ∑𝐶′)/(∑𝐹′ − ∑𝐶′) (33) 
where ∑𝑟 is the sum of RIF scores in I, ∑𝐶′ is the sum of the same RIFs if they are all equal 
to “C”, and ∑𝐹′ is the sum if they all equal to “F”. Further the total impact of the RIFs on 
each failure cause is calculated from: 
  𝑟 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑖 + ∑ 𝑤𝐼𝑖
𝑟
𝑖∈𝐼  (34) 
where we have summed the interaction effects for one subset of interactions. In principle 
there might be more than one subset of interaction effects, and we also need to add these. 
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Step 10: determination of the failure rate for similar failure mode 
Using the same method presented in (Rahimi and Rausand, 2013), given the assumption that 
𝜃𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝑖 = 0.3  and 𝜃𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑖 = 1.1  for all the failure modes. We can obtain the values of N 
calculated based on equation 22. Further the values of 𝜅𝑖 calculated based on equation 22 and 
equation 25. The failure rate related to each failure mode for topside pump are available from 
step 3. The updated failure rates for failure modes of the subsea pump are obtained based on 
equation 26. 
Step 11: the total failure rate of the new subsea pump 
Finally, the total failure rate for the new subsea pump can be calculated by summing up the 
failure rate of each failure mode. As mentioned previous, even though the contributing failure 
modes to the total failure rate are not completely independent, we consider it is sufficiently 
accurate estimate of the sum of failure rate of each failure mode.  
However, since we only considered a few failure modes, failure causes and RIFs, it is not 
possible to obtain any failure rate estimate for the subsea pump. In a real case, a subsea pump 
should be able to survive five years with a probability of at least 95%. The case study has 
only illustrated the stepwise approach. Only four failure modes have been considered. 
Besides, a comprehensive and thorough consideration of RIF is very important for getting a 
reliable estimate of failure rate. 
4.2 case study 
Step 1: new system familiarization 
The study object is a pump that used to move fluids in a pipeline. The pump is made of 
components that are normally found in standard topside pumps, but the design and materials 
are improved and the application is new.  The tasks in this step are almost the same as in the 
approach presented in (Rahimi and Rausand, 2013). The purpose of this case study is to 
illustrate the new method, not to present a complete and accurate failure rate estimate; 
therefore we ignore some failure modes, failure causes and RIFs that do not give the biggest 
contribution to the system failure rate.  
Step 2: functional analysis 
To delimit the scope of the study, we first define the physical boundary of the system and 
analyze the critical failure modes and their corresponding failure causes, for which FMECA 
is recommended to be used. The physical boundary of the known topside is specified in 
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(OREDA, 2009). The subunits of a topside pump are: pump unit, power transmission, control 
and monitoring, lubricating system, impellers, miscellaneous.  
As described in (Rahimi and Rausand, 2013), the subsea pump and the electric motor are 
integrated in a single pressure-containing cartridge with static seals towards the environment. 
Here we consider the cartridge and the pump as the study objects which will make it more 
reasonable to include the environmental condition factors in the analysis. In principle, all the 
critical failure modes and failure causes for the subsea pump have to be identified and listed. 
However, due to the complexity of subsea systems, the number of failure modes, failure 
causes, and RIFs can be very high that we are not able to cover all of them in this case. 
Therefore, we only consider the most important failure modes and the failure causes which 
are listed in Table 19. In addition, an influence diagram will be illustrated in Figure 12.  If we 
could have more detail about the design, we prefer to conduct a fault tree analysis to help us 
understand the system in component level. However, limited to the high confidential of new 
technology for the subsea industry, we hence only able to present a general structure of the 
subsea pump, see Figure 10. 
Table 19 Important failure modes and failure causes 
Category Description 
Failure modes Fail to start on demand (FTS) 
 Low output (LOO) 
 Spurious stop (UST) 
 Leakage to the environment (LTE) 
Failure causes Mechanical failure-general (MFG) 
 Clogging/plugged (CLG) 
 Instrument failure-general (IFG) 
 Control failure (CF) 
 Corrosion & erosion (CE) 
 Human error (HE) 
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 Step 3: reliability information acquisition from similar systems 
The subsea pump and the topside pump have to be compared with respect to technological 
solutions, failure modes, failure causes. The topside lubrication system is not feasible subsea 
and a totally different design may be required, such as magnetic bearings. To assess the effect 
of this difference will require a detailed analysis and is outside the scope of this thesis. In this 
case, we therefore assume that all the important failure modes of the subsea pump are found 
to be similar to topside pump. The failure causes are also found to be similar, although with 
slightly differences. 
Step 4: model definition and selection of RIFs 
In this case, the main RIFs on level 1 are loads and capacity (LC), frequency of use, location 
of operation (LO), frequency of preventive maintenance (FOM), quality of maintenance, 
maintenance policy, corrosion and humidity (CH), working load/stress (WS) and competence 
(C) . Furthermore, they are illustrated in the hierarchical RIF model associated with their 
corresponding RIFs on level 2 (i.e., management task, management information, management 
general), see Figure 11. However, to simplify the analysis, we assume that the quality of 
maintenance and frequency of use for the new subsea pump are in the same condition 
comparing to the similar topside pump. Therefore, the selected RIFs are just FOM, LO, LC, 
CH, WS and C. 
Figure 10 The physical structure of the new subsea pump 
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Figure 11 The hierarchical RIF model 
 
Adding the functional analysis in step 2 we could conduct the reliability influence diagram to 
model the effect of operational, environmental, maintenance, and human factors, see Figure 12. 
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Figure 12 The reliability influence diagram 
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Step 5: RIF’s importance measurement (Vinnem et al., 2012). 
We use the Birnbaum-like measure to assess the importance of RIFS. However, since we are 
not aiming to get an accurate prediction we only provide the approximate weight of each RIF, 
see Table 20. The weighting of the RIFs is done by expert judgment. In practice, the 
assessment of the weights is based on a general discussion of the importance with platform 
personnel and the analysts. The weights are normalized as the sum of the weights for the 
RIFs influencing a failure cause should be equal to 1. 
Table 20 The weight of RIF for each failure cause 
    RIFs 
FOM LC LO CH WS C 
MFG 1 - - - - - 
CLG - 1 - - - - 
IFG 0.70 - 0.30 - - - 
CF - - 1 - - - 
CE - - 0.35 0.65 - - 
HE - - - - 0.5 0.5 
 
Step 6: scoring the effects of RIFs 
How we score the effect of RIFs is almost the same as in (Rahimi and Rausand, 2013) where 
we use the seven-point score for RIF given in Table 12.  The assessment of the RIFs for the 
topside and the subsea pump is presented in Table 21 in the format of Table 14. The scores 
indicate how much lower or higher are the effects of RIFs on a subsea pump compared with a 
topside pump. For example, the RIF “location of operation” effects on the failure cause 
“corrosion and erosion” for both subsea pump and the topside pump, and therefore they are 
given value of 1 representing relevant. In addition the effect  of location of operation on “CE” 
for a subsea pump seems to be significantly higher than a topside pump, owing to the depth 
of location will influence the corrosion rate, and therefore given the value of 2. 
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Table 21 Scoring of RIFs for subsea pump by comparison with the topside pump 
 Failure causes 
RIFs Category Interpretation  MFG CLG IFG CF CE HE 
FOM TS Every year Relevance 1 0 1 0 0 0 
 SS Every 5 years Relevance 1 0 1 0 0 0 
   Score 1 0 0 0 0 0 
LC TS Normal Relevance 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 SS Up to 2 times more Relevance 0 1 0 0 0 0 
   Score 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LO TS Offshore (wind…) Relevance 0 0 1 1 1 0 
 SS Sea bed (depth…) Relevance 0 0 1 1 1 0 
   Score 0 0 -2 1 2 0 
CH TS In air Relevance 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 SS Under water Relevance 0 0 0 0 1 0 
   Score 0 0 0 0 2 0 
WS TS  Relevance 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 SS  Relevance 0 0 0 0 0 1 
   Score 0 0 0 0 0 -1 
C TS  Relevance 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 SS  Relevance 0 0 0 0 0 1 
   Score 0 0 0 0 0 -1 
 
Step7: weighting the contribution of failure cause to the failure mode 
The new contributing weights for the subsea pump have to be determined based on the 
information in OREDA and in step 3. The weights are summarized in Table 22. The field data 
indicate that human error plays a critical role in major accidents; however, our focus is 
technical factors. We hence give relatively lower weight to HE. This may not be realistic. 
Table 22 The topside and subsea contribution weights of failure causes of failure modes 
Failure 
modes 
Failure causes 
MFG CLG IFG CF CE HE MFG CLG IFG CF CE HE 
Sum 
Old contributing weights () New contributing weights () 
FTS 0.60 - - - - 0.40 0.75 - - - - 0.25 1 
LOO 0.60 0.30 - - - 0.10 0.67 0.23 - - - 0.10 1 
UST - - - 0.45 0.45 0.10 - - - 0.36 0.54 0.10 1 
LTE - - - - 1 - - - - - 1 - 1 
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Step 8: modeling of dependencies in terms of fault tree 
The simplified model of scoring regime for each common effect factor and a simple example 
can be found in (Vinnem et al., 2012). There are two feasible ways to include them in the 
modeling. One way is to model explicitly the common cause effects by including additional 
basic events in the fault tree and the event tree. This can be done easily in both the BNN 
model and the hybrid model. The other alternative, which can only be implemented by the 
hybrid model, is to do a recalculation of the minimal cut sets in the fault trees. The challenge 
then is to describe the possible dependencies for various classes of basic events, and then add 
common cause effects when the minimal cut set contributions are calculated. For both of the 
two practical ways, it will also require an assessment of the size of the common causes. 
Step 9: modeling of interactions between RIFs 
We only present the principle of how to model the interactions between RIFs, not intend to 
adjust the scores listed Table 21. 
Step 10: determination of the failure rate for similar failure mode 
Table 23 shows the values of 𝜂𝑗  calculated based on equation21. Since only frequency of 
maintenance affects MFG, which is the only case will contribute in the value of average score 
of MFG, where the weight of failure of maintenance for MFG is equal to 1, and the average 
𝜂𝑗 is equal to 
1
3
, The value of average score for MFG is calculated by 1 ∗ 1 ∗
1
3
= 0.3.  
Table 23 Table of the value of 𝜼𝒋 for each failure cause 
Failure cause MFG CLG IFG CF CE HE 
nj 0.33 0 -0.2 0.33 0.33 -0.33 
 
The values of 𝜅𝑖 calculated based on equation 22 and equation 25 are summarized in Table 
24. The sum of 𝑤𝑗𝑖
𝑆𝑛𝑗is calculated by: 
 0.6 ∗
1
3
+ 0.4 ∗
−1
3
+ 0.6 ∗
1
3
+ 0.1 ∗
−1
3
+ 0.45 ∗
1
3
+ 0.45 ∗
1
3
+ 0.1 ∗
−1
3
+ 1 ∗
1
3
= 0.83, 
which is greater than 1. Therefore, 𝐶𝑖 = 𝜃𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑖 − 1 = 0.1 . Further we can get 𝜅𝑖 , for 
example, for FTS, the κ is equal to 0.1 ∗ (0.6 ∗
1
3
+ 0.4 ∗
−1
3
) = 0.0066. 
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Table 24 Table of the values of .. for each failure mode 
𝜃𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝜃𝑚𝑎𝑥 Failure modes 𝐶𝑖 𝜅𝑖 
0.3 1.1 FTS 0.1 0.0066 
0.3 1.1 LOO 0.1 0.0167 
0.3 1.1 UST 0.1 0.0267 
0.3 1.1 LTE 0.1 0.0330 
 
The failure rate related to each failure mode for topside pump are available from step 3. The 
updated failure rates for failure modes of the subsea pump are obtained based on equation 26 
and listed in Table 25. The failure rates are given per 106 hours. 
Table 25 The failure rates for each failure mode from topside and subsea 
Failure modes FTS LOO UST LTE 
Failure rates for topside pump 40.15 82.91 96.00 49.75 
Failure rates for subsea pump 40.42 84.29 98.56 51.39 
 
Step 11: the total failure rate of the new subsea pump 
Finally, the total failure rate for the new subsea pump can be calculated by summing up the 
failure rate of each failure mode. However, since we only considered a few failure modes, 
failure causes and RIFs, it is not possible to obtain any failure rate estimate for the subsea 
pump.  
In principle, we could predict the failure rate of the new subsea pump if we conduct a 
comprehensive analysis following the procedure introduced in section 4.1. 
The case study has demonstrated that the model gives a good basis for ranking the proposed 
failure rates prediction method. In addition, the general model can be successfully applied to 
various installations. When analyzing subsea equipment or systems, the reliability prediction 
process can be extremely important and difficulty. Therefore, there is no attempt made here 
to present a thorough analysis. 
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Chapter 5 Summary and recommendations for further work 
This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first section, the applicability and limitation of 
these approaches are discussed. Furthermore, on the basis of the case study following the new 
procedure for failure rates prediction of plant-specific equipment, a comparison between the 
new reliability prediction approach and existing approaches is conducted which shows that it 
is applicable and more comprehensive. In the second section, existing problems to be solved 
are enumerated and recommendations for further work are proposed. 
5.1 Summary and Conclusion 
Based on the philosophy of reliability prediction methodologies introduced in Chapter 2, we 
have chosen several feasible models and methods, which are specific in an industrial area, to 
discuss. Most of them give reasonably accurate values for the failure rates; however, they all 
have significant weaknesses, see section 3.5. 
Based on these existing approaches, we combined some of them and developed a new 
approach capable of prediction complex new subsea systems that are adapted from similar 
topside. There are several improvements in the new approach.  
First of all, we provide more comprehensive model for RIF analysis.  On one hand, the plant-
specific conditions of technical, human, operational, as well as organizational RIFs that 
influence the predicted failure rates are all considered and illustrated by a hierarchical RIF 
model. A complete list of RIFs is very important owing to the comparative characteristics of 
the approach. On the other hand, a Birnbaum-like measure is applied for measuring the 
importance of RIFs. Differ from giving RIFs equal weight as in other approaches, the 
Birnbaum-like measure helps us figure out which RIF influence the system reliability most. 
This gives us a practical way of making design decision more cost effective. In other words, 
it confirms that the control of probability of failure on demand can be achieved through the 
control of changes in RIFs 
Furthermore, taking the fact that influences of RIFs on one failure cause are not independent 
each other into consideration, the interactions between RIFs are modeled quantitatively and 
conceptually. In the case study, although a numerical calculation is not performed, neither the 
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interactions influence how we predict the failure rate of new subsea pump. This is just due to 
the limitation of information. The principle is totally applicable. 
In addition, we include common cause effects in analyzing the dependences between 
different failure modes so that the system failure rate is no longer the simple sum of failure 
rates for all failure modes, which is more realistic in industry application. One way to model 
explicitly the common cause effects by including additional basic events in the fault trees. 
The other way in to a recalculation of the minimal cut sets in the fault trees, which is 
demonstrated by a simple example. To carry out a dependency analysis, further knowledge of 
the BNN model and the hybrid model. 
5.2 Recommendations for Further Work 
The usefulness of a reliability prediction is a dependent on how well the prediction satisfies 
the user’s objectives. However, the accuracy of the prediction results is dependent on the 
accuracy and completeness of the information used to perform he prediction, and in the 
method used to conduct the prediction. Many manufactures have stated that the carious 
reliability prediction methodologies based on statistical analysis of limited historical data can 
be significantly inaccurate and inconsistent when compared to actual field performance. 
Investigation of major accidents has shown that human error is the most common cause of 
system failure. However, it is difficult to give quantitative analysis on human error and 
organizational defects. Moreover, the assessment of RIF scores, failure causes contribution 
weights for failure modes and many other data are dependent on expert judgment. Both of the 
two issues are somehow subject to perception of experts.   
Besides, these approaches presented in this project all have a weakness that they do not take 
uncertainty into consideration. We may relate uncertainty to model and data, which is also 
called sensitivity analyses in some papers. 
All in all, it is our belief that the best reliability prediction could only be achieved by a 
combined use of different methods.  A specific reliability figure is of less concern compared 
to the confidence in the effective reliability level of the product to be sold. The use made of 
the reliability prediction concepts should also be coherent, i.e., based on sound principles, 
explained to the customer throughout the whole process. 
75 
 
However, what industries really want is a risk factor and not only a reliability prediction: they 
want to know the risk of new equipment compared to a consolidate equipment. 
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Appendix A 
Acronyms 
AF Accelerate factor 
BNN Bayesian belief network 
BORA Barrier and operational risk analysis 
CCA Circuit card assembly 
COTS Commercial off the shelf 
CPT Conditional probability table 
DFM Dynamic flow graph methodology 
DoD Department of defense 
ETA Event tree analysis 
EUC Equipment under control 
FAST Functional analysis system technique 
FT Fault tree 
FMECA Failure modes, effects and criticality analysis 
GTST Goal tree-success tree 
HEP Human error probability 
MEMS Micro electro-mechanical systems 
MFM Multilevel flow modeling 
MLD Master logic diagram 
MTTF Mean time to failure 
RIF Reliability-influencing factor 
SADT Structure analysis and design technique 
SIS Safety instrumented system 
PFD Probability of failure on demand 
PH Proportional hazards 
PSA The petroleum safety authority Norway 
PoF Physics-of-failure 
QRA Quantitative risk analysis 
RBD Reliability block diagram 
RID Reliability influencing diagram 
RIF Reliability influencing factor 
TQP Technology quantification program 
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Appendix B 
Comparison of Reliability Prediction Methodologies (Pechta et al., 2002) 
 
Field 
data 
Test 
data 
Stress 
and 
damage 
Models 
Handbook Methods 
MIL-
HDBK-
217 
RAC’s 
PRISM 
SAE’s 
HDBK 
Telecordia 
SR-32 
CNET’s 
HDBK 
Does the methodology identify the sources used to develop the 
prediction methodology and describe the extent to which the source is 
known? 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No 
Are assumptions used to conduct the prediction according to the 
methodology identified, including those used for the unknown data? 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
Are sources of uncertainty in the prediction results identified? Can 
be 
Can 
be  
Can be No No No No No 
Are limitations of the prediction results identified? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Are failure modes identified? Can 
be  
Can 
be 
Yes No No No No No 
Are failure mechanisms identified? Can 
be 
Can 
be 
Yes No No No No No 
Are confidence levels for prediction results identified? Yes Yes Yes No No No No No 
Does the methodology account for life cycle environmental conditions, 
including those encountered during a) product usage (including power 
and voltage conditions), b)packaging, c)handling, d) storage, e) 
transportation, and f) maintenance conditions? 
Can 
be 
Can 
be 
Yes No No No No No 
Does the Methodology account for material, geometry, and architectures 
that comprise the parts? 
Can 
be  
Can 
be 
Yes No No No No No 
Does the methodology account for part quality? Can 
be 
Can 
be 
Yes      
Does methodology allow incorporation of reliability data and 
experience? 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No 
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